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I   INTRODUCTION 
Euthanasia remains a topical issue in Australia. Legislative attempts  
to reform the law occur regularly. In 2013 alone, three Bills seeking to  
legalise voluntary euthanasia (‘VE’) or physician-assisted suicide (‘PAS’) were 
introduced into different state parliaments; 1  and two issues and background 
papers were written to inform those debates.2 In June 2014, the Australian Greens 
Senator and now leader of that party, Richard Di Natale, released an exposure 
draft of a Bill for consultation which would enable an Australian resident to 
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1  Ending Life with Dignity Bill 2013 (SA); Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2013 (NSW); Voluntary 
Assisted Dying Bill 2013 (Tas).  
2  Larissa Giddings and Nicholas McKim, Voluntary Assisted Dying: A Proposal for Tasmania 
(Consultation Paper, February 2013) <http://stors.tas.gov.au/941696>; Gareth Griffith and Lenny Roth, 
‘Euthanasia’ (Issues Backgrounder, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of New South Wales, 2013) 
<http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/key/Euthanasia/$File/Euthanasia+Iss
ues+Backgrounder+update.pdf>. See also a report released by the independent think tank, Australia21, 
calling for reform in this area: Bob Douglas, Lindy Willmott and Ben White, ‘The Right To Choose an 
Assisted Death: Time for Legislation?’ (Report, Australia21, April 2013) <http://www.australia21.org.au/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/08/J2056-Assisted-Death-Report_WEB.pdf>. This report followed an 
Australia21 round table hosted by the Australian Centre for Health Law Research at the Queensland 
University of Technology in January 2013, which was informed by a background paper produced for the 
event. The background paper was later published as: Ben White and Lindy Willmott, ‘How Should 
Australia Regulate Voluntary Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide?’ (2012) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 
410. 
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receive assistance to die. 3  In May 2015, the Victorian Legislative Council 
directed the Standing Committee on Legal and Social Issues to report on the need 
for laws to allow citizens to make ‘end-of-life choices’ (a reference that is 
sufficiently broad to include VE and PAS). Most recently, in December 2015, 
Senator David Leyonhjelm from the Liberal Democratic Party introduced a Bill 
into the Senate seeking reform in this field.4 VE and PAS also became a critical 
policy platform for political parties during the 2013 federal election.5 Discussion 
of these issues remains prevalent in the media.6 In part, this is fuelled by the not 
infrequent prosecutions of family members, friends and medical practitioners 
who have been involved with the death of persons who were terminally ill or who 
otherwise requested assistance to terminate their own life.7 
This issue is also topical internationally, as we witness a trend towards the 
legalisation (or decriminalisation) of VE and PAS. There has been legislative 
reform in the Netherlands,8 Belgium,9 Luxembourg,10 the United States (Oregon,11 
Washington,12 Vermont13 and California)14 and in Canada (Quebec).15 Assisting 
another to die is also lawful in Switzerland provided the assistance is not given 
                                                 
3  Senate, Parliament of Australia, Medical Services (Dying with Dignity) Exposure Draft Bill 2014 (2014) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Committees/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/dying_with_dignity/ 
Exposure%20draft%20dying%20with%20dignity.pdf>. 
4  Restoring Territory Rights (Assisted Suicide Legislation) Bill 2015. 
5  See, eg, Australian Greens, Greens To Take ‘Dying with Dignity’ to Canberra (15 August 2013) 
<http://greens.org.au/greens-take-%E2%80%98dying-dignity%E2%80%99-canberra>; Voluntary 
Euthanasia Party, Party Policy (2015) <http://www.vep.org.au/policy>; Australian Sex Party, Federal 
Euthanasia Policy (2015) <http://www.sexparty.org.au/policy/3-federal-euthanasia-policy>. 
6  See, eg, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Australia’s First Euthanasia Clinic Opens’, 7.30 Report, 5 
December 2013 (Alex Mann) <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2013/s3906089.htm>; Megan 
Doherty, ‘Euthanasia: Time To Talk’, The Canberra Times (Canberra), 27 July 2013, 1; Daniel Wills, 
‘New Euthanasia Bid Fails’, The Advertiser (Adelaide), 15 June 2012, 5; Matthew Denholm, ‘Premier 
Sponsors State Euthanasia Bill’, The Australian (Sydney), 27 September 2013, 6; George Williams, 
‘Tasmania Leads Way on Voluntary Euthanasia’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 27 February 2013, 
9; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Euthanasia Campaigner under Scrutiny’, 7.30 Report, 18 
December 2012 (Mike Sexton) <http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2012/s3657550.htm>; Bruce 
Mounster, ‘Nitschke Visit Stirs Euthanasia Debate’, The Mercury (Hobart), 17 February 2012, 13; 
Graham Watson, ‘Euthanasia Sense’, Saturday Extra, The Northern Territory News (Darwin), 23 March 
2013, 21; David Harradine, ‘Economy of Euthanasia Woes’, The Mercury (Hobart), 9 October 2013, 22; 
Aryelle Sargent, ‘McKim Euthanasia Case’, Advocate (Burnie, Tasmania), 11 October 2013, 3; Matt 
Smith, ‘Euthanasia Bill Reborn’, The Mercury (Hobart), 4 February 2013, 5. 
7  See, eg, Carter v A-G (Qld) [2014] 1 Qd R 111; R v Klinkerman [2013] VSC 65; R v Nielsen [2012] QSC 
29; R v Justins [2011] NSWSC 568; R v Maxwell [2003] VSC 278; DPP (Vic) v Karaca [2007] VSC 190; 
R v Nicol [2005] NSWSC 547; DPP (Vic) v Nestorowycz [2008] VSC 385; DPP (Vic) v Rolfe (2008) 191 
A Crim R 213; R v Hood (2002) 130 A Crim R 473. 
8  Wet toetsing levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding 2000 [Termination of Life on Request 
and Assisted Suicide Act 2000] (Netherlands). 
9  Loi relative à l’euthanasie 2002 [Act on Euthanasia 2002] (Belgium). 
10  Loi du 16 mars 2009 sur l’euthanasie et l’assistance au suicide [Law of 16 March 2009 on Euthanasia 
and Assisted Suicide] (Luxembourg) JO, 16 March 2009, 615. 
11  Death with Dignity Act, Or Rev Stat §§ 127.800–127.995 (1994). 
12  Death with Dignity Act, Wash Rev Code §§ 70.245.010–70.245.904 (2008). 
13  Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act, Vt Stat Ann §§ 5281–93 (2013). 
14  End of Life Option Act, Cal Health and Safety Code §§ 443–443.22 (2015). 
15  Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, RSQ 2014, c S-32.0001. 
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for ‘selfish motives’.16 Last year, the Canadian Supreme Court held unanimously 
that criminal law provisions prohibiting physician assistance in dying 
contravened rights conferred by the Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, schedule B part 
I (‘Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’).17 In some jurisdictions, such as 
in British Columbia in Canada18 and the United Kingdom,19 VE and PAS have 
been the subject of specific prosecutorial guidelines. 
                                                 
16  The Strafgesetzbuch [Criminal Code] (Switzerland) was not specifically amended (ie, after its enactment) 
to permit assisted suicide for unselfish reasons. In the first draft of the Bill in 1893 prepared by its 
progenitor, Carl Stooss, the draft code prohibited assisted suicide for all reasons. However, a criminal law 
professor, Ernst Hafter, before the adoption of the draft code, argued that only where a person provides 
assistance to suicide for selfish motives should they be exposed to criminal penalties. Hafter’s arguments 
stimulated debate, and were taken into account by the draft code prepared by the Federal Council in 1918 
under the then art 102. The debate surrounding the inclusion of the selfish motives clause within the draft 
code, surprisingly, did not entail any material discussion of medically assisted dying (unlike the present 
art 114), but rather focused on the philosophical complexities of criminalising the assistance of a non-
criminal act, and romantic notions appertaining to ‘honour’ suicides, or the suicide of rejected lovers. The 
draft code was adopted by referendum in 1938, which included the amended provisions, and entered into 
force in 1942. Therefore, the ‘selfish reasons’ element has always been present in Swiss law since the 
codification of the criminal law: Olivier Guillod and Aline Schmidt, ‘Assisted Suicide under Swiss Law’ 
(2005) 12 European Journal of Health Law 25; National Advisory Commission on Biomedical Ethics, 
Assisted Suicide (Opinion No 9/2005, 27 April 2005) 31 <http://www.nek-cne.ch/fileadmin/nek-cne-
dateien/Themen/Stellungnahmen/en/suizidbeihilfe_en.pdf>. 
17  Carter v A-G (Canada) [2015] 1 SCR 331. 
18  Criminal Justice Branch, Ministry of Attorney General (British Columbia), Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide (Crown Counsel Policy Manual No 56880-00, 15 March 2004) <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/ 
prosecution-service/policy-man/pdf/EUT1-EuthanasiaAndAssistedSuicide-15Mar2004.pdf>. For a 
critique of these guidelines, see Jocelyn Downie and Ben White, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion in Assisted 
Dying in Canada: A Proposal for Charging Guidelines’ (2012) 6(2) McGill Journal of Law and Health 
113. 
19  In R (Pretty) v DPP (UK) [2002] 1 AC 800 and Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] III Eur Court HR 427, 
the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights rejected the existence of a right to PAS or 
VE. However, in R (Purdy) v DPP (UK) [2010] 1 AC 345, the House of Lords concluded that, pursuant 
to arts 8(1)–(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as 
amended by Protocol No 14bis to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature 27 May 2009, CETS No 204 (entered into force 1 September 2009) 
(‘European Convention on Human Rights’), the code for Crown Prosecutors was required to provide 
greater guidance to promote accessibility and foreseeability in prosecutions, and therefore a more specific 
policy identifying the facts and circumstances relevant to the institution of criminal proceedings should 
be established. For the prosecutorial guidelines, see Director of Public Prosecutions (UK), Policy for 
Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (February 2010) Crown Prosecutor 
Service <http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html>. For 
commentary on these guidelines, see Ben White and Jocelyn Downie, ‘Prosecutorial Guidelines for 
Voluntary Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Autonomy, Public Confidence and High Quality Decision-
Making’ (2012) Melbourne University Law Review 656; Penney Lewis, ‘Informal Legal Change on 
Assisted Suicide: The Policy for Prosecutors’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 119; Glenys Williams, ‘Assisting 
Suicide, the Code for Crown Prosecutors and the DPP’s Discretion’ (2010) 39 Common Law World 
Review 181; Alexandra Mullock, ‘Overlooking the Criminally Compassionate: What Are the Implications 
of Prosecutorial Policy on Encouraging or Assisting Suicide?’ (2010) 18 Medical Law Review 442. 
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Within Australia, there have been many attempts to pass VE legislation. 
From 16 June 199320 until the date of writing, 51 Bills have been introduced into 
Australian parliaments dealing with legalising VE or PAS. 21  Despite these 
numerous attempts, the only successful Bill was the Rights of the Terminally Ill 
Act 1995 (NT) (‘ROTTIA’), which was enacted in the Northern Territory, but a 
short time later overturned by the controversial Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth). 
Yet, in stark contrast to the significant political opposition, for decades 
Australian public opinion has overwhelmingly supported law reform legalising 
VE or PAS.22  
While there is ongoing debate in Australia, both through public discourse23 
and scholarly publications,24 about the merits and dangers of reform in this field, 
there has been remarkably little analysis of the numerous legislative attempts to 
reform the law, and the context in which those reform attempts occurred. The 
aim of this article is to better understand the reform landscape in Australia over 
the past two decades. The information provided in this article will better equip 
Australians, both politicians and the general public, to have a more nuanced 
understanding of the political context in which the euthanasia debate has been 
and is occurring. It will also facilitate a more informed debate in the future. The 
                                                 
20  That is, when the Voluntary and Natural Death Bill 1993 (ACT) was presented: ACT Government, 
Voluntary and Natural Death Bill 1993 (Discharged), ACT Legislation Register <http://www.legislation. 
act.gov.au/b/db_15844>. 
21  Within this figure of 51, the authors have included the attempts at a Commonwealth level to abolish the 
Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth) which deprives the territories of the power to pass legislation legalising 
VE or PAS. 
22  In 1962, the earliest Morgan Gallup poll indicated VE support was at 47 per cent. Similar polls were 
conducted on a regular basis until 1995 when public support for VE had increased to 78 per cent: 
Margaret F A Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Clarendon Press, 1997) 263. More 
recent polls from varying sources (Morgan Poll, Newspoll and other independently administered surveys) 
in 2002–12 indicate that national support has varied between 78 per cent and 85 per cent: Your Last 
Right, Australian Public Desire for Legalisation of Assisted Dying in Restricted Circumstances (White 
Paper, 2012) <http://www.dwdnsw.org.au/documents/2013/POLL%20WHITE%20PAPER% 
202012.pdf>; South Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Society, Public Opinion Polls on Voluntary 
Euthanasia Law Reform in Australia (Factsheet No 02, 2012) <http://www.saves.asn.au/facts/fs02.pdf>. 
23  See, eg, Dan Harrison, ‘MPs from Both Sides Back Euthanasia Reform’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 11 November 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/mps-from-both-
sides-back-euthanasia-reform-20141111-11kis9.html>; Staff Writers, ‘Let’s Settle This: Should Australia 
Legalise Euthanasia?’, The Courier Mail (online), 4 September 2014 <http://www.couriermail.com.au/ 
news/lets-settle-this-should-australia-legalise-euthanasia/story-fnihsrk2-1227047380264>; Bob Douglas, 
‘The Right to Assisted Death’, Comment, The Canberra Times (online), 20 May 2013 
<http://www.canberratimes.com.au/comment/the-right-to-assisted-death-20130519-2juwp.html>; 
Josephine Tovey, ‘Euthanasia Is Just a Bridge Too Far’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 23 October 
2012, 1. 
24  See, eg, White and Willmott, above n 2; Lorana Bartels and Margaret Otlowski, ‘A Right To Die? 
Euthanasia and the Law in Australia’ (2010) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 532; Brian Pollard, ‘Fatal 
Licence: Commentary on the “Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary Euthanasia) 
Amendment Bill 2008”’ (2010) 22(2) Bioethics Research Notes 19; Bob Brown, ‘The Right To Die: 
Legislating for Euthanasia’ (2008) 89 Precedent 29; Alan Rothschild, ‘Physician-Assisted Death: An 
Australian Perspective’ in Dieter Birnbacher and Edgar Dahl (eds), Giving Death a Helping Hand – 
Physician-Assisted Suicide and Public Policy: An International Perspective (Springer-Verlag, 2008). 
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article seeks to achieve this aim by considering two separate but related aspects 
of the reform attempts. 
First, in Part III, the authors chart the many legislative attempts to reform the 
law over the previous two decades (including the circumstances surrounding the 
passage of the Northern Territory legislation and its demise when overturned by 
the Commonwealth Government), and the jurisdictions in which these reform 
attempts are occurring. Part III then considers some political dimensions of the 
debate including who has been proposing reform, relevant political affiliations 
and the role, more broadly, that party politics has played in the past and may play 
in the future. That Part also provides a detailed analysis of how far the Bills 
progressed through parliaments and how they were disposed of. Finally, through 
an analysis of parliamentary records, the authors have identified which Bills 
came close to passing, and comment on whether any conclusions can be drawn 
from the fact that these particular Bills had a greater level of political support. 
The second way in which this article seeks to deepen understanding is 
through an in-depth examination of the 51 Bills. If there is to be legislative 
reform in Australia, there will and should be close scrutiny and debate about the 
details of the Bills. As we shall see in Part IV, there can be significant variation 
in the content of the legislative proposals which affects, in important ways, how 
the regimes would operate. Decisions made about the content of the Bill will 
affect issues such as eligibility criteria (restricted to adults with capacity who are 
terminally ill and seek assistance to die, or available to a broader cohort), 
safeguards (involvement of treating doctor only, or should other specialists be 
involved), and state oversight (should each death be independently reviewed to 
ensure compliance with the regime, and should such review be prospective or 
retrospective). Yet, to date, there has not been a comprehensive analysis of how 
the Australian Bills have dealt with these and other issues. We do not know 
whether there has been general consensus or diversity on these and other critical 
points in the Bills to date. A consensus in some areas but variation in others, if 
this is the case, may signal the issues on which there might be particular focus 
when these Bills are debated in future years. Part IV analyses in detail the various 
legislative models and notes those areas of convergence and divergence. In this 
analysis, particular mention is made of the features of the Bills identified in Part 
III as ‘close to passing’. In Part V, the authors make some concluding remarks 
about the Australian reform experience to date, and speculate about the 
implications that this may have for reform attempts in the future.  
We begin, however, in Part II, by defining frequently used terms. In this 
debate, people can be at cross-purposes because of different understandings of 
the same term. It is important to clarify what we mean in this article when we use 
various terms. 
 
6 UNSW Law Journal Volume 39(1) 
II   TERMINOLOGY 
Both in Australia and overseas, the VE and PAS debates have been 
undermined by semantic ambiguity. We therefore seek to clarify what we mean 
when we refer to the terms included in the table below.25 
 
Table 1: Terminology 
Term Meaning Example 
Euthanasia For the purpose of relieving suffering, a 
person performs a lethal action26 with the 
intention of ending the life of another person 
A doctor injects a patient with a lethal 
substance to relieve that person from 
unbearable physical pain 
Voluntary 
euthanasia 
(‘VE’) 
Euthanasia is performed at the request of 
the person whose life is ended, and that 
person is competent 
A doctor injects a competent patient, at 
their request, with a lethal substance to 
relieve that person from unbearable 
physical pain 
Competent A person is competent if he or she is able to 
understand the nature and consequences of 
a decision, and can retain, believe, 
evaluate, and weigh relevant information in 
making that decision 
 
Non-voluntary 
euthanasia 
Euthanasia is performed and the person is 
not competent 
A doctor injects a patient in a post-
coma unresponsive state (sometimes 
referred to as a persistent vegetative 
state) with a lethal substance 
Involuntary 
euthanasia 
Euthanasia is performed and the person is 
competent but has not expressed the wish 
to die or has expressed a wish that he or 
she does not die 
A doctor injects a competent patient 
who is in the terminal stage of a 
terminal illness such as cancer with a 
lethal substance without that person’s 
request 
                                                 
25  This table is based on that included in White and Willmott, above n 2, 412. 
26  Note that the authors do not include within this definition positive steps taken by a person to stop 
treatment which results in death (such as removing a breathing tube). In this regard, see further our 
definition of ‘withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment’ below and accompanying footnote 
references. 
2016 (Failed) Voluntary Euthanasia Law Reform in Australia 7 
Term Meaning Example 
Withholding or 
withdrawing 
life-sustaining 
treatment27 
Treatment that is necessary to keep a 
person alive is not provided or is stopped 
Withdrawing treatment: A patient with 
profound brain damage as a result of a 
heart attack is in intensive care and 
breathing with the assistance of a 
ventilator, and a decision is made to 
take him or her off the ventilator 
because there is no prospect of 
recovery  
Withholding treatment: A decision is 
made not to provide nutrition and 
hydration artificially (such as through a 
tube inserted into the stomach) to a 
person with advanced dementia who is 
no longer able to take food or hydration 
orally  
Assisted 
suicide 
A competent person dies after being 
provided by another with the means or 
knowledge to kill him- or herself 
A friend or relative obtains a lethal 
substance (such as Nembutal) and 
provides it to another to take 
Physician-
assisted 
suicide (‘PAS’) 
Assisted suicide where a doctor acts as the 
assistant 
A doctor provides a person with a 
prescription to obtain a lethal dose of a 
substance 
 
III   LEGISLATIVE AND POLITICAL HISTORY IN AUSTRALIA 
This Part of the article analyses the many attempts to reform euthanasia law 
in Australia’s states and territories. It commences with a detailed consideration of 
the first attempts to introduce VE laws and the circumstances surrounding the 
enactment of the Northern Territory legislation and its overturn, and then 
provides an overview of all reform attempts in Australia. Importantly, this Part 
extends beyond a description of the legislative attempts and unpacks some of the 
politics associated with the euthanasia reform efforts: political affiliations of 
proponents, voting trends of members of parliament (along party lines or not) 
and, more generally, the role politics has played in euthanasia reform in 
Australia. Next, this Part charts how far the various Bills progressed, and 
identifies seven Bills that garnered the most political traction. Based on 
identification and analysis of these seven Bills, this Part concludes with some 
                                                 
27  This is sometimes referred to as ‘passive euthanasia’ as the death arises from not giving life-sustaining 
treatment. There has been considerable debate concerning whether withdrawing life-sustaining treatment 
can relevantly be distinguished from giving a lethal injection. We will not discuss that controversy here 
because we are concerned with how VE has been understood in the context of the legislative reforms that 
have been proposed. For discussion of the debate, however, see Andrew McGee, ‘Does Withdrawing 
Life-Sustaining Treatment Cause Death or Allow the Patient to Die?’ (2014) 22(1) Medical Law Review 
26; Andrew McGee, ‘Acting To Let Someone Die’ (2015) 29 Bioethics 74. 
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observations and speculation about what factors may be influential in achieving 
reform. 
 
A   Early Years of Reform (Attempts) 
The first VE Bill introduced into any Australian parliament was the 
Voluntary and Natural Death Bill 1993 (ACT). The Bill was introduced into  
the Legislative Assembly of the Australian Capital Territory by Michael  
Moore (independent) on 16 June 1993.28 The Bill was designed to achieve three 
purposes: (a) to facilitate VE in limited circumstances;29 (b) to permit a doctor to 
withhold or withdraw treatment in limited circumstances;30 and (c) to enable a 
person to give a direction about future treatment to operate when that person 
becomes incompetent.31 When the Bill was introduced, the matter was referred to 
the Select Committee on Euthanasia, chaired by Michael Moore, whose report 
was tabled in Parliament on 14 April 1994.32 The Select Committee concluded 
that it would not be appropriate33 and politically inopportune34 to pass legislation 
to allow for VE, and the Bill was discharged from the notice paper by Michael 
Moore on 11 May 199435 prior to the 1995 election.36 In coming years, Michael 
Moore would introduce into the Legislative Assembly four further Bills to 
legalise or decriminalise euthanasia.37 
On 22 February 1995, soon after the discharge of the Voluntary and Natural 
Death Bill 1993 (ACT), the Chief Minister of the Northern Territory, Marshall 
Perron,38 tabled a private member’s Bill to legalise VE and PAS.39 On the same 
day, that Bill was referred to a Northern Territory Select Committee on 
                                                 
28  Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 June 1993, 1878–9 
(Michael Moore). 
29  See Voluntary and Natural Death Bill 1993 (ACT) long title, cl 4. 
30  See Voluntary and Natural Death Bill 1993 (ACT) long title, cl 21. This aspect of the proposed Bill 
clarified the common law position that withholding and withdrawing treatment was lawful in some 
circumstances. 
31  Voluntary and Natural Death Bill 1993 (ACT) cls 4–6. 
32  Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 14 April 1994, 818 (Michael 
Moore). 
33  Select Committee on Euthanasia, Parliament of the Australian Capital Territory, Report: Voluntary and 
Natural Death Bill 1993 (1994) 6–7. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 11 May 1994, 1377 (Michael 
Moore). 
36  Despite the Voluntary and Natural Death Bill 1993 (ACT) being discharged, Parliament enacted the 
Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) which was limited to the withholding and withdrawal of medical 
treatment, and the making of directions and powers of attorney in relation to withholding and withdrawal 
of treatment that would apply after the patient has lost capacity. 
37  Medical Treatment (Amendment) Bill 1995 (ACT); Medical Treatment (Amendment) Bill 1997 (ACT); 
Euthanasia Referendum Bill 1997 (ACT); Crimes (Assisted Suicide) Bill 1997 (ACT). 
38  Interestingly, Marshall Perron is the only member affiliated with the Liberal Party (he was the leader of 
the Country Liberal Party in the Northern Territory) to have introduced a Bill pertaining to VE. 
39  Northern Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 February 1995, 2495 (Marshall 
Perron). 
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Euthanasia for consideration.40 The report of the Committee, which was tabled in 
May 1995, provided no specific recommendations regarding whether legislation 
permitting VE should be introduced, although it recommended amendments to 
the initial Bill.41 On 24 May 1995, Marshall Perron resigned as Chief Minister, 
indicating that he did not want his position to influence the manner in which the 
members of his party voted. After extensive debate, the Assembly divided and on 
a vote of 13:12, the Bill passed the second reading stage. 42  After a debate 
extending into the early morning of 25 May 1995, the Bill passed the committee 
stage and third reading on a vote of 15:10.43 With the enactment of the ROTTIA, 
the Northern Territory became the first, and only, jurisdiction within Australia to 
introduce legislation for VE. It also became the first jurisdiction in the world to 
establish a legislative regime that permitted the practice. 
However, the ROTTIA did not last long on the statute book. On 9 September 
1996, Liberal Party member, Kevin Andrews, introduced into the 
Commonwealth Parliament the controversial Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996 (Cth) 
which sought to amend the territories’ Self-Government Acts44 to deprive them of 
their capacity to pass VE or PAS legislation.45 Despite serious remonstrations by 
the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory Governments, on  
9 December 1996, the Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996 (Cth) passed the second 
reading stage 90:39,46 and passed the committee and third reading stages with a 
resounding 88:35 majority. 47  The Bill was introduced into the Senate on  
12 December 1996 by Senator John Herron of the Liberal Party.48 On 24 March 
1997, the Bill passed the second reading 49  and third reading stages without 
amendment 38:33.50 The Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth) came into effect on  
27 March 1997,51 amending the territory Self-Government Acts and dismantling 
the ROTTIA. Since the passage of the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth), there 
have been six unsuccessful attempts by members of the Australian Democrats52 
and Australian Greens53 to remove the limitation on the legislative power of the 
                                                 
40  Ibid 2505–28 (Shane Stone). 
41  Select Committee on Euthanasia, Parliament of the Northern Territory, The Right of the Individual or the 
Common Good? Report of the Inquiry by the Select Committee on Euthanasia (1995) 64–6. 
42  Northern Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 May 1995, 3734. 
43  Ibid 3782. 
44  Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth); Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) 
Act 1988 (Cth); Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth). 
45  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 September 1996, 3672 (Kevin 
Andrews). 
46  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 December 1996, 8060 (Robert 
Halverson, Speaker). 
47  Ibid 8078 (Robert Halverson, Speaker). 
48  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 12 December 1996, 7358–60 (John Herron). 
49  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 24 March 1997, 2326 (Margaret Reid). 
50  Ibid 2331 (Margaret Reid). 
51  Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth) s 2. 
52  Euthanasia Laws (Repeal) Bill 2004 (Cth), introduced by Lyn Allison: Commonwealth, Parliamentary 
Debates, Senate, 3 March 2004, 20 717 (Lyn Allison). 
53 These Bills have been: 
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territories. Most recently, in December 2015, a member of the Liberal 
Democratic Party introduced a Bill into the Senate seeking to do the same.54 
 
B   Trends in Legislative Attempts 
There have been 51 Bills introduced into the various Australian parliaments 
since 1993. The names of these Bills, when, where and by whom they were 
introduced are listed in the Appendix. Seven of these Bills sought to remove the 
prohibition on territories legislating in this area and a further five sought to hold a 
referendum on law reform. The remaining 39 Bills proposed a model for law 
reform permitting VE and/or PAS. 
Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of the number of these VE Bills 
introduced and the year of their introduction. 
 
Figure 1: Number of VE/PAS Bills Introduced into Australian Parliaments 
 
As demonstrated by the trendline,55 the number of Bills introduced has been 
progressively increasing. The increasing trend is significant having regard to the 
                                                                                                                         
 Australian Territories Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2007 (Cth), introduced by Bob Brown: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 8 February 2007, 17 (Bob Brown); 
 Rights of the Terminally Ill (Euthanasia Laws Repeal) Bill 2008 (Cth), introduced by Bob Brown: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 February 2008, 335 (Bob Brown); 
 Restoring Territory Rights (Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation) Bill 2008 (Cth), introduced by Bob 
Brown: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 17 September 2008, 4983 (Bob Brown); 
 Restoring Territory Rights (Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation) Bill 2010 (Cth), introduced by Bob 
Brown: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 September 2010, 304 (Bob Brown); and 
 Restoring Territory Rights (Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation) Bill 2012 (Cth), introduced by 
Richard Di Natale: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 November 2012, 9737 
(Richard Di Natale). 
54  Restoring Territory Rights (Assisted Suicide Legislation) Bill 2015. This Bill is still before the Senate. 
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fact that, since 1997, no Australian territory has been able to introduce a VE Bill 
due to the effect of the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth). Furthermore, between 
1993 and 1997, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory 
introduced two and five VE Bills respectively into parliament, in contrast to the 
states’ and Commonwealth’s average of 0.6756 Bills per jurisdiction over this 
same five-year period. The territories, rather than the states, were more active in 
introducing VE initiatives prior to the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth). Indeed, 
the significant decline in the number of Bills introduced between 1998 and 1999 
directly correlates with the reduction in legislative attempts in the territories’ 
parliaments. Since 1998, the states and the Commonwealth have assumed a more 
active role in introducing an average of 2.22 Bills each year.57 Since 2007, the 
average has increased to 2.7 Bills each year across Australia.58 South Australia 
(20), New South Wales (8) and Western Australia (6) have led the states in 
introducing VE Bills. Tasmania has introduced two VE Bills, Victoria has only 
introduced one Bill, and Queensland is the only jurisdiction never to have 
introduced a VE or PAS Bill. There have been seven attempts at a federal level to 
abolish the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth). 
 
C   Politics of Euthanasia Law Reform 
The politics of euthanasia law reform – in particular, the extent to which 
euthanasia has been a political issue and the reason that this has (or has not) been 
the case – has received remarkably little attention in the Australian literature.59 
This article does not aim to fill that gap in the literature, but in this section, we 
provide information about the political positions taken (or not taken) by 
Australian political parties, as well as the political affiliations of those members 
of parliament who have proposed reform. We provide an analysis of some of the 
voting patterns that have occurred, and make some observations about the 
political nature of the debate in Australia and the implications of this on the 
likelihood of reform. 
Despite the ongoing and sustained media attention on VE and public support 
for reform, the largest political parties in Australia, the Liberal Party, the 
Australian Labor Party and the National Party, have not developed policy 
positions on the topic. This is in stark contrast to other parties that have deemed 
this to be an issue that should not be ignored. The Australian Greens have 
consistently supported VE since the party was formed in 1992, its policy being in 
                                                                                                                         
55  A trendline is a simplified line of best fit demonstrating the direction of a correlation between a 
dependent and independent variable. 
56  Between 1993 and 1997, 11 Bills were introduced into Australian parliaments. Seven were introduced in 
the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory. The remaining four were introduced in the 
other six jurisdictions over this time period, making an average of only 0.67 Bills per jurisdiction. 
57  This calculation is taken from 1998 to 2015. 
58  The average number of Bills introduced into Australian parliaments between 2007 and 2013 was 3.29 
annually. In 2014 and 2015, only one VE Bill was introduced. 
59  But see Alison Plumb, ‘The Future of Euthanasia Politics in the Australian State Parliaments’ (2014) 29 
Australasian Parliamentary Review 67, which considered the role of politics and political affiliation in 
this context in SA and Tasmania. 
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favour of allowing terminally ill patients to seek assistance to die from their 
doctor.60 Historically, the Australian Democrats have also supported reform of 
the law,61 and more recently, the Australian Sex Party and the Liberal Democratic 
Party. Both the Christian Democratic Party and the Family First Party have 
adopted a position at the other end of the spectrum, and are strongly opposed to 
legalising VE. 
The table below provides a breakdown of the VE Bills by affiliation of the 
proponent to a political party, if any, as well as by jurisdiction. 
 
Table 2: Voluntary Euthanasia Bills by Political Affiliation of Proponent and Jurisdiction 
 Cth ACT NSW NT SA Tas Vic WA Total 
Number of Bills 
introduced 
7 
(14%) 
5  
(10%) 
8  
(16%) 
2  
(4%) 
20 
(39%) 
2 
(4%) 
1  
(2%) 
6  
(12%) 
51 
(100%) 
Political Affiliation of Proponent 
Independent 0 5 0 0 11 0 0 0 
16 
(31%) 
Australian 
Democrats 
1 0 1 0 3 0 0 4 
9 
(18%) 
Australian Greens 5 0 7 0 2 1 1 2 
18  
(35%) 
Australian Labor 
Party 
0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 
5 
(10%) 
Country Liberal 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1 
(2%) 
Liberal Democratic 
Party 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
(2%) 
Australian Greens 
–Australian Labor 
Party Joint Bill 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 
(2%) 
* All VE Bills introduced into Australian parliaments have been private members’ Bills. 
 
As can be seen, the independents and the members of the Australian Greens 
and the Australian Democrats have been the major proponents of VE reform. The 
Australian Greens introduced their first VE Bill in 2001 in New South Wales, 
and have accounted for 37 per cent of all VE Bills introduced in parliaments 
                                                 
60  Australian Greens, Dying with Dignity <http://greens.org.au/dying-with-dignity>. 
61  The Australian Democrats 2010 Action Plans expressly supported the enactment of nationally consistent 
VE laws: Australian Democrats, Australian Democrats Action Plans 2010 <http://australian-
democrats.org.au/action-plans-2010.php#.VmJW4GDotMs>. This reference was removed from its 2013 
Action Plans: Australian Democrats, Australian Democrats Action Plans <http://australian-
democrats.org.au/policies2013.php#.VmJW7mDotMs>. 
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across Australia,62 while the Australian Democrats have introduced 18 per cent. 
Independent members have been responsible for the introduction of 31 per cent 
of VE Bills. While this might seem significant, all independent VE Bills have 
been introduced by only two individuals, Michael Moore and Dr Bob Such. 
Indeed, it would seem that VE has primarily been the responsibility of individual 
members of parliament, with only 21 individuals having introduced all 51 Bills 
over the past 20 years. Only six Bills have been introduced by Australian Labor 
Party members.63 Significantly, only one Bill has been introduced by a member 
of a conservative political party, Marshall Perron, when he introduced the 
ROTTIA, the only Bill within Australia to have been successfully enacted. 
Regardless of whether a political party has developed a policy position on VE 
or, if one has been developed, the stance taken, all parties have universally 
allowed conscience votes on the matter of VE. Nevertheless, there appears to be 
a strong correlation between party affiliation and voting preferences, and indeed, 
many decisions are determined virtually according to the chosen party lines.64 For 
example, in relation to the Euthanasia Referendum Bill 1997 (ACT), every 
Australian Labor Party member voted against the Bill, and every Liberal Party 
member (except one) voted against the Bill. 65  Similarly, every Liberal and 
Australian Labor Party member voted against the Crimes (Assisted Suicide) Bill 
1997 (ACT), a Bill that significantly mitigated penalties for medical practitioners 
engaging in VE, while every Australian Greens member supported the Bill.66 
Similarly, when the Voluntary Euthanasia Trial (Referendum) Bill 2003 (NSW) 
was introduced, every Australian Greens and Australian Democrat member voted 
in favour of the Bill, and every member from the Liberal and Labor Parties voted 
against the Bill.67 The same occurred when voting on the Voluntary Euthanasia 
Referendum Bill 1997 (NSW).68 Furthermore, in both the Voluntary Assisted 
Dying Bill 2013 (Tas) and the Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2013 (NSW), all 
members of the Liberal Party voted against the proposed VE regimes.69 In recent 
times, Australian Labor Party members are more likely to have an even 
distribution of votes, but the tendency has continued for members of conservative 
political parties to vote against VE Bills.70 
                                                 
62  Note that this includes the Voluntary Assisted Dying Bill 2013 (Tas), which was a joint initiative of the 
Australian Greens and the Australian Labor Party. 
63  Note that this includes the Voluntary Assisted Dying Bill 2013 (Tas), which was a joint initiative of the 
Australian Greens and the Australian Labor Party. 
64  Note, however, this is not always the case, as noted by Plumb, above n 59 in the context of two attempts 
to reform in SA and Tasmania. 
65  Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 November 1997, 3672 
(Michael Moore). 
66  Ibid 3673 (Michael Moore). 
67  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 13 November 2003, 4931 (Ian Cohen). 
68  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 15 May 1997, 8659 (Elisabeth Kirkby). 
69  Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 17 October 2013, 114 (Tim Morris); New South 
Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 May 2013, 20 785 (Don Harwin). 
70  This practice has resulted in allegations of political gamesmanship: New South Wales, Parliamentary 
Debates, Legislative Council, 23 May 2013, 20 781 (Cate Faehrmann); Tasmania, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Assembly, 16 October 2013, 118 (Michelle O’Byrne). 
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The apparent influence of political allegiances on voting practices raises the 
broader question of what role politics currently plays in euthanasia law reform in 
Australia, and will play in the future. As evident from the above, a range of 
political coalitions have formed. The most common coalition (in favour of VE 
reform) is the Australian Greens and Democrats, frequently supported by 
sympathetic independents. Parties with direct religious affiliations forming the 
foundation of their policies, such as the Family First and Christian Democratic 
Parties, have universally opposed the passage of VE legislation. While the 
Liberal and Australian Labor Parties allow conscience votes, Liberal Party 
members are more likely to oppose VE, and Australian Labor Party members are 
more likely to have an even distribution.  
The role that politics will play in future attempts to reform euthanasia in 
Australia is an interesting question in a country where the major political parties 
are secular and whose policy positions are, for the most part, not born of religious 
influence. As we have seen, the Liberal, Labor and National Parties do not have a 
formal position on euthanasia, so this issue is not one in which any of these 
parties can differentiate themselves from one another in the electorate. It is likely 
that none of these parties perceive that any political advantage will be gained by 
making euthanasia law reform a political issue.71 While the Christian Democratic 
Party has a policy that stems from its religious philosophy, it is a minor political 
party which currently lacks political influence.  
The Australian political landscape can be contrasted with countries such as 
the Netherlands and Belgium where there are more political parties, frequent (and 
varied) coalitions are negotiated to form government and parties can be divided 
along secular and non-secular lines. In such environments, having an articulated 
position (either for or against) euthanasia provides a point of differentiation, so 
can be a basis upon which voters can choose one party over another. It was this 
secular–non-secular divide that was influential in euthanasia becoming a political 
issue in both the Netherlands and Belgium.72  
Although historically, religiously based parties have had little, if any, 
political influence in Australia, in the current political climate, minor parties have 
had a great deal more influence in some jurisdictions than has ever been the 
                                                 
71  Cf the views expressed by Neil Francis, a pro-euthanasia advocate and Chief Executive Officer of 
YourLastRights.com Ltd in Neil Francis, ‘Australian Public Desire for Legislation of Assisted Dying in 
Restricted Circumstances’ (White Paper, YourLastRight.com, 2012). The white paper is based on 
research undertaken by Newspoll and commissioned by YourLastRights.com Ltd. In that white paper, it 
is suggested that ‘[m]ore than a quarter of all voters (29%) will change their vote if their otherwise most 
likely candidate or party’s stance on assisted dying law reform is opposed to their own stance’ and that 
‘[a] politician whose stance is opposed to assisted dying law reform will lose significantly more votes at a 
general election (23%) than a politician who supports reform (6%)’: at [1] (emphasis altered). 
72  Christoffer Green-Pedersen, ‘The Conflict of Conflicts in Comparative Perspective: Euthanasia as a 
Political Issue in Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands’ (2007) 39 Comparative Politics 273. 
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case.73 This fact, combined with the political alliances that have already formed 
in Australia on this issue, may mean there is an increased likelihood for 
euthanasia reform to become a political issue in the future. This is certainly 
consistent with other indicators. For example, ‘euthanasia’ is raised as a political 
issue on ‘Vote Compass’, an online tool that has been increasingly used and 
promoted in the lead-up to elections, to assist the voting public to analyse 
political positions of the parties. Further, position statements on the topic are 
emerging not only from political parties but also from some peak groups, 74 
possibly an indicator that this is an issue upon which it is no longer possible or 
appropriate not to have a position. These developments, of course, occur against 
the backdrop of regular and ongoing opinion polls that reveal sustained public 
support for reform. 
 
D   Results of Bills 
Having considered some of the political aspects of the euthanasia debate, 
including the political affiliations of members introducing the Bills into 
parliament and some of the voting patterns that have emerged, it is instructive to 
examine in more detail how far in the parliamentary process the Bills reached, 
and how they were disposed of. For law reform to occur, it is not enough to have 
a proponent for change. The relevant parliament must be prepared to allocate 
time for the Bill to be considered and debated. If a high proportion of Bills 
remain as notices of motion without being introduced into parliament, for 
example, that signals less of an appetite for reform than if they all reached the 
                                                 
73  See, eg, Brenton Prosser and Richard Denniss, Minority Policy: Rethinking Governance When 
Parliament Matters (Melbourne University Press, 2015). See also media commentary on the rise in 
political influence of minor parties: Ross Fitzgerald, ‘The Major Threat of Minor Parties in New Senate’, 
The Australian (online), 7 June 2014 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/the-major-
threat-of-minor-parties-in-new-senate/story-e6frg7eo-1226946409257>; Antony Green, ‘Record Vote for 
Minor Parties at 2013 Federal Election’ on Antony Green, ABC Elections: Antony Green’s Election Blog 
(19 November 2013) <http://blogs.abc.net.au/antonygreen/2013/11/record-vote-for-minor-parties-at-
2013-federal-election.html>. 
74  See, eg, The Australian & New Zealand Society for Palliative Medicine Inc, The Practice of Euthanasia 
and Assisted Suicide (Position Statement, 31 October 2013) <http://www.anzspm.org.au/c/anzspm? 
a=sendfile&ft=p&fid=1383782787>; Palliative Care Australia, Euthanasia and Physician Assisted 
Suicide (Position Statement, October 2011) <http://palliativecare.org.au/download/2448/>; Australian 
Medical Association, The Role of the Medical Practitioner in End of Life Care 2007 (Position Statement, 
5 September 2014) <https://ama.com.au/system/tdf/documents/ps_on_the_role_of_the_medical_ 
practitioner_in_end_of_life_care_2007_amended_2014_0.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=40572>; AMA 
Tasmania, AMA Tasmania’s Position on Euthanasia (March 2013) <https://ama.com.au/sites/default/ 
files/documents/2_-_AMA_Tasmania_submission_to_Consultation_Paper_on_Voluntary_Assisted_ 
Dying_draft_of_1st_March_2013.pdf>; The Royal Australian & New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, 
Physician Assisted Suicide (Position Statement, May 2011) <https://www.ranzcp.org/Files/Resources/ 
College_Statements/Position_Statements/ps67-pdf.aspx>; Australian Nursing Federation, Voluntary 
Euthanasia/Assisted Suicide (Position Statement, May 2012) <http://anmf.org.au/documents/policies/ 
PS_Voluntary_euthanasia.pdf>; Royal College of Nursing Australia, Position Statement: Voluntary 
Euthanasia/Assisted Suicide (Position Statement, 2006) <https://web.archive.org/web/20130430045203/ 
http://rcna.org.au/WCM/Images/RCNA_website/Files%20for%20upload%20and%20link/policy/docume
ntation/position/voluntary_euthanasia.pdf>. 
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second (or third) reading stage and were debated in full. As evident from the 
analysis below, the 50 Bills75 that have been introduced over the past two decades 
have had varying degrees of progress through and consideration by their 
respective parliaments. In this section, we identify the stage that all of the Bills 
reached and how they were disposed of, that is by being passed, withdrawn, 
discharged or defeated, or by lapsing.  
Table 3 provides a summary of the stage that the Bills reached and the 
disposition of the various Bills, broken up by jurisdiction. 
 
Table 3: Summary of the Stage Reached and Disposition of Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Bills 
 Cth ACT NSW NT SA Tas Vic WA Total 
Number of Bills 
introduced 
6 
(12%) 
5 
(10%) 
8 
(16%) 
2 
(4%) 
20 
(40%) 
2 
(4%) 
1  
(2%) 
6  
(12%) 
50 
(100%) 
Stage Bill Attained in Parliamentary Process76 
Not introduced 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
4  
(8%) 
First reading 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2  
(4%) 
Second reading 6 4 3 1 15 2 1 6 
38 
(76%) 
Committee stage/ 
third reading 
0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 
5 
(10%) 
Passed both 
houses 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1  
(2%) 
Disposition of Bills 
Discharged 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4  
(8%) 
Withdrawn 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2  
(4%) 
Lapsed 5 0 2 0 14 0 0 5 
26 
(52%) 
Defeated 0 3 3 1 5 2 1 1 
16 
(32%) 
Passed 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1  
(2%) 
                                                 
75  Note that the recent Bill introduced by Liberal Democratic Party member, Senator David Leyonhjelm, is 
not included in the analysis in this section because the Bill is still before the Senate at the time of writing. 
76  References to first, second and third readings relate to the first house of parliament in which the Bill 
originated. Apart from the ROTTIA, no Bill has successfully passed through one house of parliament let 
alone two. 
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1 Progress through Parliamentary Stages 
As can be seen from Table 3, a high majority of the Bills (88 per cent) 
reached at least the second reading stage, with only 8 per cent failing to be 
introduced into parliament. While 88 per cent of Bills reached the second reading 
stage, only 12 per cent passed that stage. In this section, we consider the various 
stages reached by the VE Bills against the backdrop of the historical purposes of 
the various parliamentary phases. 
The purpose of the first reading stage is to enable the relevant chamber of 
parliament to inform itself of the nature and content of the Bill.77 Parliamentary 
practice prescribes that the first reading stage is a purely formal procedure and 
one in which Bills are ordinarily passed without opposition.78 The Voluntary 
Euthanasia Referendum Bill 1997 (NSW), introduced by Elisabeth Kirkby on 15 
May 1997, is the only VE Bill that was defeated at the first reading stage. 
The second reading stage is the most important element of the legislative 
process. Its purpose is to debate the principle of the Bill, rather than individual 
clauses.79 Accordingly, Bills containing technical defects or limitations capable 
of rectification by reasoned amendment should be permitted to progress to the 
committee or consideration in detail stages, at which time closer scrutiny can be 
given to any technical issues. For this reason, some parliamentary speakers have 
ruled it impermissible for members to discuss a Bill by debating each individual 
clause. Instead, it has been ruled that the second reading debate should be 
confined to the objectives and foundation of the legislative proposal.80 
Despite 88 per cent of Bills (44 Bills) reaching the second reading stage, all 
but one of those Bills did not progress any further. Having regard to the purpose 
of the second reading stage, this suggests that it is the efficacy or justifiability of 
VE at a policy level that is the problem, rather than the perceived inadequacy of 
the framework or procedural safeguards contained within the relevant legislative 
proposals. If the majority of politicians supported the principle of VE, but 
objected to the procedural safeguards or regulatory framework of the proposed 
legislation, a larger number of Bills would be expected to pass the second reading 
stage, though possibly fail during the consideration in detail stage. 
The consideration in detail stage involves a rigorous and detailed analysis of 
the specific provisions, procedures, and mechanisms of the legislative proposal.81 
The applicable standing rules and orders often provide for the consideration of 
each provision of the Bill in order to ensure that all provisions are properly 
scrutinised and evaluated, and prohibit any amendments which would negative or 
                                                 
77  B C Wright (ed), House of Representatives Practice (Department of the House of Representatives, 6th ed, 
2012) 356; Robert Rogers and Rhodri Walters, How Parliament Works (Routledge, 6th ed, 2013) 208–9. 
78  Wright (ed), above n 77, 357. 
79  Ibid 361–3; Rogers and Walters, above n 77, 209–10. 
80  See, eg, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 November 1920, 6906 
(Elliot Johnson); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 November 1932, 
2601 (George Mackay). 
81  Wright (ed), above n 77, 374–5; Rogers and Walters, above n 77, 210–24. 
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undermine the purpose of the Bill.82 This is because the relevant chamber of 
parliament has already assented to the underlying principle of the Bill during the 
second reading stage, and any further debate of the objectives of the Bill would 
be unnecessarily duplicative, constitute a collateral attack on the previous 
division, and subvert the function of the consideration in detail stage. Only  
12 per cent of VE Bills have reached the consideration in detail stage. 
Accordingly, 88 per cent of VE Bills have not been subject to a detailed  
analysis of their specific clauses. Therefore, the common arguments that VE Bills 
lack adequate procedural safeguards, or that euthanasia cannot be safely 
regulated, present presumptive conclusions that often have not been adequately 
tested or examined by the relevant chamber of parliament. 
 
2 Disposition of Bills 
Once introduced into parliament, and regardless of the parliamentary stage 
reached, there was significant variation in how the Bills were disposed of. More 
than half (52 per cent) of Bills lapsed, 12 per cent were discharged or withdrawn, 
and only 32 per cent were defeated.83 A Bill is defeated when a division is called 
and a vote taken. Of interest, however, is that many of the Bills were not 
disposed of in this fashion. In the sections that follow, we consider circumstances 
in which VE Bills were discharged, withdrawn or, as is most commonly the case, 
lapsed. 
 
(a) Discharge and Withdrawal of Bills 
Six of the 50 VE Bills (12 per cent) have been either discharged (4 Bills or  
8 per cent) or withdrawn (2 Bills or 4 per cent). Although this is not a large 
number, it is worth attempting to understand why 12 per cent of VE Bills were 
terminated in this way rather than by being defeated or lapsing. A Bill is 
‘discharged’ when it has been formally presented to parliament and is 
subsequently removed from the notice paper.84 A Bill is ‘withdrawn’ when the 
sponsor of the Bill has recorded a notice of intention to present the legislative 
proposal in the notice paper and subsequently removes the notification from the 
notice paper prior to the first reading.85 In each Australian jurisdiction, it is the 
sponsor of the Bill who most commonly is responsible for the discharge or 
withdrawal of the Bill.86  
A Bill is generally withdrawn or discharged for one of the following reasons: 
an equivalent Bill is proceeding through another chamber of the parliament; the 
Bill possesses latent substantive defects which may impede its passage through 
parliament; the Bill is procedurally or formally noncompliant with an applicable 
                                                 
82  Wright (ed), above n 77, 376–7. 
83  Out of the 50 Bills analysed in Table 3, five were Bills seeking to facilitate a referendum on VE. Two of 
these Bills lapsed, and three were defeated. 
84  Wright (ed), above n 77, 296, 372–3. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Ibid. 
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standing rule or order; the Bill has no reasonable prospect for success; or it is 
considered that keeping the Bill on the notice paper is politically inconvenient. 
It is difficult to obtain direct evidence on why a Bill is discharged or 
withdrawn by its sponsoring member. Possibly the prevailing sociopolitical 
circumstances and the relatively controversial nature of VE Bills may explain 
why some VE Bills are terminated in this way. Putting aside one New South 
Wales Bill, 87  the mean period in which the remaining five VE Bills were 
discharged or withdrawn was 249 days, or approximately eight months, from an 
election. In each instance, the election date was reasonably foreseeable at the 
time of discharge or withdrawal as it was held towards the end of the three- or 
four-year prescribed legislative term for the relevant jurisdiction. The fact that 
VE Bills were discharged or withdrawn on average within eight months of a 
reasonably foreseeable election date may suggest a perception among certain 
parliamentarians that VE Bills are politically undesirable policies to be associated 
with during an election campaign. 
 
(b) Lapsing of Bills 
The dissolution or prorogation of parliament causes all proceedings to 
conclude and any outstanding Bills on the notice paper to lapse regardless of 
their stage of progression. 88  As more than half the VE Bills (26 Bills or  
52 per cent) are disposed of by lapsing, it is important to explore why this might 
be the case. The authors suggest that this occurs as a result of two, integrally 
related, issues: the lack of appetite of the three major political parties to debate 
the issue; and the relatively limited amount of parliamentary time devoted to 
private members’ Bills. 
A private member’s Bill is one that is advanced by a member of parliament 
which has not officially been introduced by the government. 89  All Bills 
introduced by independent politicians or the opposition are private members’ 
Bills unless formally adopted by the government. Even Bills introduced by 
ministers of the incumbent government will be private members’ Bills where 
they are not submitted as part of government business. Under the Australian 
Westminster parliamentary system, the majority of time in parliament is allocated 
to considering government business. As explained in the House of 
Representatives Practice handbook: 
The increasing need for Governments to control House time, assisted by the 
growth of strong party loyalty, led to a steady curtailment of opportunities for 
private Members to initiate bills and motions, and procedures to expedite the 
consideration of government business.90 
Although procedural changes have resulted in more time being allocated to 
private members’ business, it remains substantially constrained by the political 
                                                 
87  Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2003 (NSW). 
88  See, eg, Wright (ed), above n 77, 223–4, 228. 
89  Ibid 580. 
90  Ibid 573. 
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and temporal exigencies of the relevant chamber of parliament.91 For example, 
between 1990 and 2014, only 8.3 per cent of time within the Commonwealth 
House of Representatives was assigned to private members’ business, which 
includes legislation and motions.92 
Private members’ motions and petitions are often limited to the private 
members’ business period in the chamber of parliament which, in some 
jurisdictions, is not assigned separate time periods from that allocated to 
committee and delegation business.93 Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, private 
members’ motions and petitions are not heard in the order of submission, but in 
an order determined by a selection committee which prioritises private members’ 
business.94 Finally, private members’ Bills are frequently referred to advisory 
committees for consideration, which further delays the progress of the Bill 
through parliament. 
The reluctance of the three major political parties to engage with the 
contentious issue of VE was considered in Part III(C). As these political parties 
are in government in all jurisdictions, the above practices and protocols enable 
governments to dictate the parliamentary agenda which, as evidenced in Table 3, 
has resulted in many of the VE Bills lapsing. 
The practical impediments that can be encountered by the proponents of 
reform are illustrated by considering the procedural history of the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 1996 (SA). The Bill was introduced into the South Australian 
Legislative Council on 6 November 1996 by a member of the Australian Labor 
Party, Anne Levy. However, as a result of frequent and protracted adjournments, 
the division for the second reading was not called until eight months later on 9 
July 1997. On the same date, the Bill was moved for consideration by a select 
committee. Sandra Kanck, leader of the Australian Democrats, questioned the 
legitimacy of the referral of the Bill to a select committee, stating that: 
I am not sure how much a select committee will achieve. We all know that the 
committee will disappear when the election is called, so I query its usefulness 
other than as a ploy to stop its becoming a controversial issue at the election. 
Nevertheless, I will support the committee.95 
The Bill was referred to the Select Committee on 9 July 1997 and, after 
convening only twice, the Bill lapsed when Parliament was prorogued before the 
general election held on 11 October 1997. Despite the lapsing of the Bill, on 25 
February 1998, Carolyn Pickles, leader of the Australian Labor Party in 
opposition, moved for the Social Development Committee to consider the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1996 (SA). The Bill was not reintroduced, and the 
report of the Social Development Committee that was tabled on 20 October 1999 
recommended against the reintroduction of the Bill. 
 
                                                 
91  Ibid. 
92  Ibid 861. 
93  See, eg, ibid 574–5. 
94  Ibid. 
95  South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 9 July 1997, 1783 (Sandra Kanck). 
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E   Analysis of Bills That Were ‘Close to Passing’ 
In this section of the article, we take the analysis of reform attempts one step 
further. We seek first to identify those Bills that came ‘close to passing’. If Bills 
in a jurisdiction are regularly being narrowly defeated after a considered debate 
in parliament, this may suggest law reform is imminent in that jurisdiction. The 
opposite will be the case if there is consistently so little support for the Bill in the 
house that they are generally disposed of without division. Second, we consider 
whether identifying Bills that were ‘close to passing’ sheds any light on the 
circumstances or environment in which it is more likely that reform will occur, or 
at least be seriously debated. 
The process of identifying Bills that were ‘close to passing’ was an exacting 
and time-consuming task. A detailed investigation into each of the 50 Bills96 was 
undertaken to determine whether the particular Bill was debated in parliament 
and, if so, whether a division was called to determine support for the Bill. The 
criterion to assess whether a Bill was ‘close to passing’ is necessarily subjective 
in nature, but that chosen by the authors was as follows: the Bill was supported 
by at least 70 per cent of the number of members required to pass the Bill 
through the house.97 
As a result, the following Bills did not satisfy this criterion: 
 Bills that were not introduced to parliament; 
 Bills that were discharged or withdrawn without being debated; 
 Bills that lapsed without being debated; and 
 Bills that were debated but were defeated on the voices, or for which no 
division was called, or where less than 70 per cent of the support needed 
to pass the Bill was received. 
Using this method, only 7 of the 50 Bills that have been proposed were ‘close 
to passing’. Table 4 below lists these Bills, the proponent and party affiliation (if 
any), the jurisdiction, how the Bill was disposed of, and the numbers that 
supported and opposed the Bill. 
 
  
                                                 
96  Note that the recent Bill introduced by Liberal Democratic Party member, Senator David Leyonhjelm, is 
not included in the analysis in this section because the Bill is still before the Senate at the time of writing. 
97  For example, if there were 23 members in the relevant house, 12 members would need to support the Bill 
for it to be passed. A Bill would be regarded as ‘close to passing’ for the purpose of this article if 70 per 
cent or above of the 12 members supported the Bill. 
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Table 4: Summary of the Australian Voluntary Euthanasia Bills ‘Close to Passing’ 
Title Name Affiliation Jurisdiction Status Support Oppose 
Rights of the 
Terminally Ill 
Bill 199598 
Marshall 
Perron 
Country 
Liberal 
NT Passed 15 10 
Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 
1996 
Anne Levy Australian 
Labor Party 
SA Lapsed99 12 8 
Dying in Dignity 
Bill 2001 
Sandra 
Kanck 
Australian 
Democrats 
SA Lapsed100 10 9 
Consent to 
Medical 
Treatment and 
Palliative Care 
(Voluntary 
Euthanasia) 
Amendment Bill 
2008 
Mark Parnell Australian 
Greens 
SA Defeated  9 11 
Dying in Dignity 
Bill 2002 
Sandra 
Kanck 
Australian 
Democrats 
SA Defeated 8 13 
Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 
2012 
Bob Such Independe
nt 
SA Defeated  20 22 
Voluntary 
Assisted Dying 
Bill 2013 
Larissa 
Giddings and 
Nicholas 
McKim 
Australian 
Greens–
Australian 
Labor Party 
joint Bill 
Tas Defeated 11 13 
 
Some observations can be made from this analysis. The first is to note that 
reform of the law governing VE is difficult. Of all the attempts over the past two 
decades, only one Bill was successful and only six others were ‘close to passing’. 
These seven Bills represent only 14 per cent of all attempts. This is perhaps a 
surprising outcome, especially in light of a high level of community support for 
                                                 
98  As amended by Rights of the Terminally Ill Amendment Act 1996 (NT). 
99  This Bill passed the second reading stage, and then lapsed. 
100  This Bill passed the second reading stage, and then lapsed. 
2016 (Failed) Voluntary Euthanasia Law Reform in Australia 23 
the enactment of legislation.101 The second observation is that there is nothing 
particularly remarkable about those Bills that were closer to passing than the  
43 Bills that did not satisfy the criterion. There were no particular features that 
these Bills possessed which, as a group, distinguished them from the Bills that 
were not ‘close to passing’.102 Third, these seven Bills are not all recent, nor does 
there seem to be a trend for the more recent Bills (those passed between 2010 and 
2014) to be ‘closer to passing’. Of the 14 Bills that were introduced over the past 
five years, only two were in this group of ‘close to passing’. 
Fourth, it is interesting to consider the extent to which political factors, 
including affiliation of the proponent, are influential in the progress of Bills. The 
proponents of the seven Bills cover the political spectrum with the proponent of 
the (successful) Northern Territory Bill coming from the Country Liberal Party, 
two proponents from the Australian Labor Party, two from the Australian 
Democrats, two from the Australian Greens as well as an independent. However, 
this distribution is not proportionate to the affiliations of the proponents of the 
total number of Bills that were introduced. The percentage chance of a Bill being 
‘close to passing’ is greater if the Bill is introduced by a member of a major 
political party, namely the Country Liberal Party or the Australian Labor Party. 
Of the 16 attempts by independents, only one was in the top seven Bills. Of the 
19 attempts by a member of the Australian Greens, only two were in the top 
seven Bills. Furthermore, of the nine introduced by a member of the Australian 
Democrats, only two were in the top seven Bills. By contrast, of the six 
introduced by a member of the Australian Labor Party, two were in the top seven 
Bills; and the one Bill introduced by a member of the Country Liberal Party in 
the Northern Territory was successful. 
                                                 
101  Sarah Edelman, ‘Politicians Out of Sync with Most Australians’ Views on Assisted Dying’, Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 24 February 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/politicians-out-of-sync-
with-most-australians-views-on-assisted-dying-20150224-13lzbh.html>. In a NSW election ABC Poll, of 
more than 34 000 respondents, 72 per cent strongly agreed or agreed with the proposition: ‘Terminally ill 
patients should be able to legally end their own lives with medical assistance’, compared with 16 per cent 
of respondents who did not and 11 per cent of who said they were neutral: Claire Aird, ‘NSW Election 
2015: Almost Three Quarters of Voters Support Euthanasia, Vote Compass Finds’, ABC News (online), 
15 March 2015 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-15/nsw-voters-support-euthanasia-vote-compass-
finds/6313864>. Polls of public views on euthanasia over the past 10 years have also indicated support 
for reform: 75 per cent in favour (The Australia Institute, Survey Results – Attitudes to Voluntary 
Euthanasia (6 January 2011) 2 <http://www.tai.org.au/downloadpopup/nojs/8589>); 83.4 per cent in 
favour (Newspoll, Euthanasia Study (Job No 110302, March 2011) 8 <http://www.dwdnsw.org.au/ 
documents/2011/Newspoll%202011.pdf>); 84.9 per cent in favour (Newspoll survey cited in in AAP, ‘85 
Per Cent Support Voluntary Euthanasia – Poll’, The Australian (online), 26 October 2009 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/per-cent-support-voluntary-euthanasia-poll/story-
fn3dxiwe-1225791455181>); 78 per cent in favour (Enterprise Marketing & Research Services Pty Ltd, 
Voluntary Euthanasia Research Report (May 2009) <http://tasmaniantimes.com/images/uploads/May24_ 
EMRS_V_Euthanasia_Poll_09_N_McKim_ATTACH.pdf>). 
102  The only observation that can be made regarding the likelihood of a particular kind of Bill to be 
successful or not is that the referendum Bills have never been ‘close to passing’ and appear to attract even 
less support than the defensive and permissive models. These models are discussed further in the 
following Part. 
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What does not appear to be significant is the political persuasion of the 
government in power at the time the ‘close to passing’ Bills were debated. At the 
time the seven ‘close to passing’ Bills were introduced, the Country Liberal Party 
was in government in the Northern Territory, the Australian Labor Party was in 
government in Tasmania, and the Liberal Party was in power on two occasions 
and the Australian Labor Party was in power on three occasions when Bills were 
introduced in South Australia.  
The final, and most remarkable, feature revealed by this analysis is that all of 
these seven Bills were introduced in the Northern Territory, South Australia and 
Tasmania, and five of the seven in South Australia. None of the 26 Bills 
introduced in the other jurisdictions satisfied the ‘close to passing’ criterion. 
Without further empirical research, it is difficult to know why this is the case. We 
can speculate that advocacy for controversial reform of this kind is more likely to 
succeed in smaller jurisdictions where there are fewer politicians who need to be 
persuaded for the Bill to succeed.103 
However, there are likely to be a range of other issues at play as well. The 
high profile of either the proponent or supporter of the Bill has been a feature in 
each of the Northern Territory, South Australia and Tasmania Bills that have 
been ‘close to passing’. In the Northern Territory, Marshall Perron was the Chief 
Minister for much of the time that the reform Bill was being debated, but he was 
also seen as a passionate and charismatic advocate for change. The 2012 South 
Australian Bill that was narrowly defeated by two votes, although proposed by 
independent member Bob Such, was supported by the Premier, Jay Weatherill, as 
well as two senior ministers, Pat Conlon and Paul Caica.104 In Tasmania, the 
proponents of the 2013 reform attempt were the Premier and leader of the 
Australian Labor Party, Larissa Giddings, as well as the leader of the Australian 
Greens, Nicholas McKim, both powerful political figures in that state. 
Another feature that may be at play here, and identified by Plumb in her 
research of euthanasia reform activity in South Australia and Tasmania, is the 
power and influence of interest groups that support reform in those 
jurisdictions.105 In South Australia, for example, there has been a long history of 
an active pro-euthanasia reform group. Plumb notes that the South Australian 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society (‘SAVES’), founded in 1983, has a large 
membership base and has consistently campaigned to reform the law. 106  She 
comments that a key strategy of SAVES is to increase visibility of the topic 
among politicians and the public, and refers to its monthly presence on the steps 
of Parliament where it distributes information pamphlets as well as displaying 
placards. An active pro-euthanasia lobby group, Dying with Dignity Tasmania, 
was also a feature in the Tasmanian 2013 campaign. In addition to running a 
public awareness campaign, Plumb notes that a key strategy of the group was to 
                                                 
103  The members of Parliament in SA (69), Tasmania (40) and NT (25) are small when compared with, eg, 
NSW (135), Victoria (128), WA (95) and Queensland (89). 
104  Plumb, above n 59, 72.  
105  Ibid 73–4. 
106  Ibid 73. 
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provide ‘good quality’ information to parliamentarians to assist them with their 
deliberations.107 
The goal of Part III was to provide detail of reform attempts, the political 
context in which they occurred, and to make some observations about those 
reform attempts that came ‘close to passing’. In the next Part, we take a closer 
look at the Bills themselves. 
 
IV   LEGISLATIVE MODELS OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA 
AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 
Building on the above discussion of the general nature of the Bills introduced 
and whether they came ‘close to passing’, we will now analyse the critical 
features that have emerged from all the legislative models introduced into 
Australian parliaments. We will make specific reference to the seven Bills 
identified as being ‘close to passing’ to determine if there is anything significant 
in the legislative models adopted which may have impacted upon the ‘success’ of 
the Bill. Identifying the common elements of the legislative models – especially 
those that have been close to passing – is important because it may signal 
valuable information about what model might be close to achieving a consensus 
position in parliament. This information is useful for generating informed debate 
about reform in this context. 
There are obviously many ways in which these legislative models can be 
classified and analysed. Some of these are substantive in that the law may permit 
different categories of behaviour, be it VE, PAS or both. Other modes of 
classification are structural in the sense that, if it does permit, say VE, PAS or 
both, there are different ways of doing so. For instance, it may provide that VE, 
PAS or both remain an offence, but create a defence to such conduct in certain 
circumstances. Alternatively, it may expressly decriminalise VE, PAS or both in 
certain specified circumstances. Finally, the legislative regimes can be grouped 
by examining procedural characteristics, including examining how eligibility is 
determined, for example in terms of illness and/or suffering criteria. This Part 
presents the analysis of the Australian legislative attempts in light of these 
various analytical approaches, but it should be borne in mind that there will be 
some overlap between them. 
 
1 Voluntary Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide Models 
Perhaps the most fundamental substantive issue concerns whether the 
legislative models permit only VE, only PAS, or both. VE models permit the 
administration of a lethal substance by a physician to the patient. PAS models 
permit only the prescription of a lethal substance by medical practitioners – 
                                                 
107  Ibid 81. 
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which the patient then administers to himself or herself. For some, this distinction 
is critical.108 
 
(a) Exclusively Voluntary Euthanasia Model 
Only one Australian Bill has been exclusively limited to VE. Subject to 
proposed safeguards, the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) provided that a 
medical practitioner may ‘administer euthanasia to the applicant by 
administration of a recognised drug’.109 Clause 11(6) provided that it is unlawful 
for any person other than the patient’s medical practitioner to administer VE to 
the applicant. These provisions suggest that the legislation was limited to VE and 
was not intended to encompass PAS.110 The reasons for this, and whether the 
omission was intentional, do not emerge from the limited debates surrounding the 
Bill. 
 
(b) Exclusively Physician-Assisted Suicide Model 
The PAS model enables medical practitioners to allow patients, generally 
through the prescription of lethal substances, to terminate their own lives with, or 
without, the assistance of family members. The Medical Treatment (Physician 
Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) is the only Australian Bill to permit solely 
PAS,111 allowing a treating doctor to provide assistance to an ‘adult sufferer’ to 
terminate his or her life.112  
 
                                                 
108  Timothy E Quill, Christine K Cassel and Diane E Meier, ‘Care for the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical 
Criteria for Physician Assisted Suicide’ (1992) 327 New England Journal of Medicine 1380, 1381; 
Margaret P Battin, ‘Euthanasia: The Way We Do It, the Way They Do It’ (1991) 6 Journal of Pain and 
Symptom Management 298, 300. A purported distinction between PAS and VE forms the foundation of 
the Oregon, Washington and Vermont Death with Dignity Acts (Or Rev Stat §§ 127.800–127.995 (1994); 
Wash Rev Code §§ 70.245.010–70.245.904 (2008); Vt Stat Ann §§ 5281–93 (2013)) which permit only 
PAS. For a discussion of arguments differentiating PAS from VE, see Nicholas Dixon, ‘On the 
Difference between Physician-Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia’ (1998) 28(5) Hastings Center 
Report 25. Most jurisdictions which have regulated PAS/VE practices, as illustrated in Part IV, draw no 
moral or legal distinction between VE and PAS. 
109  Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) cl 11(1). 
110  While this may have merely been a drafting error, it is noted that each VE Bill introduced into the WA 
Parliament prior to 2010 either directly or indirectly contemplated self-administration by the patient: 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1998 (WA) cl 8(5); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 (WA) cl 8(5); Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 2002 (WA) cl 8. The rationale for limiting permissible conduct to VE and not PAS is 
unclear. However, Robin Chapple, the proponent of the Bill, opened her second reading speech by stating 
that ‘[t]his Bill is not about legalising suicide’: Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Council, 20 May 2010, 3017 (Robin Chapple). Therefore, the decision to exclude PAS may have been a 
deliberate political choice to circumscribe any arguments that VE legislation effectively legalised or 
promoted suicide. 
111  After the passage of the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth), Michael Moore from the ACT introduced the 
Crimes (Assisted Suicide) Bill 1997 (ACT). While this Bill was primarily crafted in terms of PAS, cls 
5(d)(ii), (e)–(f) clearly contemplated the direct administration of lethal substances by the medical 
practitioner. Therefore, this was a mixed Bill. 
112  Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 5. In this context, ‘assistance’ includes 
giving information, prescribing, preparing or providing a drug, and providing assistance for the sufferer to 
ingest a drug, but does not include injection of lethal substances: at cl 3 (definition of ‘assistance’). 
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(c) Combined Voluntary Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide Models 
All other Australian Bills allowed both VE and PAS. The ROTTIA is a prime 
example of this model. It provided that a patient who, in the course of a terminal 
illness, is experiencing pain, suffering and/or distress to an extent unacceptable to 
the patient, may request their doctor to assist them in terminating their life.113 
‘Assist’ was defined to include the prescribing, preparation or giving of a 
substance to the patient for self-administration, and the administration of a 
substance to the patient. 114  By employing the phrase ‘the administration of  
a substance’, the ROTTIA’s formulation of ‘assist’ exceeds mere PAS  
and permits VE. This definition of ‘assist’ was also adopted, for example, in  
New South Wales and Tasmanian Bills.115 Another common approach uses the 
operative section, not the definitional provisions, to specify what constitutes 
administering VE.116  For example, the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2002 (WA) 
expressly provided for the administration of a lethal substance to the patient by 
the medical practitioner, or the provision of substances for self-administration by 
the patient.117 
 
(d) Expanded Conceptions of ‘Voluntary Euthanasia’ 
Some South Australian Bills have widened their conception of VE. For 
example, the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) provided that a medical 
practitioner may administer VE to an adult suffering unbearable pain in the 
terminal phase of a terminal illness by (a) administering drugs in appropriate 
concentrations to end life; (b) prescribing drugs for self-administration by a 
patient to allow them to end their life; or (c) withdrawing or withholding medical 
treatment in circumstances which will result in an end to life.118 The first ground 
contemplates VE; the second expands VE to incorporate PAS; while the third 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113  ROTTIA s 4. 
114  ROTTIA s 3 (definition of ‘assist’). 
115  Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) cl 3 (definition of ‘assist’); Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 
(Tas) cl 3 (definition of ‘assist’). 
116  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2002 (WA) cl 8; Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 (WA) cl 8; Crimes 
(Assisted Suicide) Bill 2007 (ACT) cl 5. 
117  Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2002 (WA) cl 8(2). 
118  Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cl 11(2). 
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ground incorporates the withholding or withdrawing of medical treatment which 
is legally119 and, many would argue, conceptually or ethically distinct from VE.120 
 
2 Permissive, Defence and Penalty Mitigation Models 
Legislative attempts to legalise VE can also be categorised as permissive, 
defence and penalty mitigation models. The permissive model provides a 
legislative framework, integrating appropriate safeguards, thereby positively 
allowing VE. This has been the most common model (35 Bills). We call it 
‘permissive’ because, under such a model, if a medical practitioner complies with 
the requirements imposed under the framework, no offence is committed. The 
onus is on the prosecution to prove that the practitioner failed to comply with the 
provisions, beyond reasonable doubt. The defence model (2 Bills), by contrast, 
provides criteria which, if satisfied, will constitute an effective defence to a 
charge of murder or manslaughter. Under this model, VE and/or PAS would 
remain an offence, to which the defendant would have a defence if he or she can 
show, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she complied with the 
requirements of the defence provisions in the relevant Act. The penalty 
mitigation model substantially reduces associated penalties. These models will 
now be discussed. 
 
(a) Permissive Models 
The permissive model normally contains the following six critical elements: 
1. power: power is conferred on treating medical practitioners to administer 
VE to certain eligible patients;121 
2. immunity: immunity against civil, criminal or disciplinary liability is 
conferred on any persons assisting in the administration of VE in good 
faith;122 
3. safeguards: protective procedures are generally prescribed to require 
competent requests, to provide information and to obtain psychiatric 
assessments; these and other safeguards are conditions precedent to 
exercising the relevant VE power or benefiting from the granted legal 
                                                 
119  Lindy Willmott, Ben White and Shih-Ning Then, ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining 
Medical Treatment’ in Ben White, Fiona McDonald and Lindy Willmott (eds), Health Law in Australia 
(Lawbook, 2nd ed, 2014) [14.20]–[14.40]. A competent patient is entitled to have a request for medical 
treatment to be withheld or withdrawn respected by his or her doctor: Brightwater Care Group Inc v 
Rossiter (2009) 40 WAR 84, 92 [32] (Martin CJ); Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A 
(2009) 74 NSWLR 88, 97 [40] (McDougall J). Legislation is therefore not required to enforce such a 
right. 
120  See, eg, McGee, ‘Does Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment Cause Death’, above n 27; McGee, 
‘Acting To Let Someone Die’, above n 27. See also John Keown who classifies the withholding or 
withdrawing of treatment as merely prudent medical practice where there is no intention to cause death: 
John Keown, ‘Against Decriminalising Euthanasia; For Improving Care’ in Emily Jackson and John 
Keown (eds), Debating Euthanasia (Hart Publishing, 2012) 83, 142–5. 
121  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cl 11. 
122  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cl 13. 
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and disciplinary immunity (the safeguards are discussed further 
below);123 
4. conscientious objections: a conscientious objections clause enables 
medical practitioners and institutions to decline to administer VE;124 
5. avoidances: miscellaneous provisions to prevent contingency clauses in 
contracts, wills, insurance and annuities from adversely affecting the 
person’s entitlements on the basis of a request for VE;125 and 
6. oversight: various mechanisms are established for systematic oversight 
of the regime, for example a commission or committee that reviews 
deaths and/or reporting to parliament about how the legislation is being 
used.126 
The ROTTIA once again illustrates the permissive model in use in Australia 
as it incorporates these six elements.127 
As the permissive model actively permits the administration of VE or PAS, 
the safeguards employed require further discussion. The protective mechanisms 
in these Bills are generally directed towards ensuring the (1) accuracy of 
diagnosis and prognosis; (2) quality of the patient’s request including information 
requirements; and (3) voluntariness of the patient’s request. Quality of request 
refers to whether the patient has capacity and, even if he or she does, the quality 
of consideration that the patient has given to the decision. Voluntariness, by 
contrast, refers to whether the patient’s free will has been exercised to make the 
decision (in order for one’s will to be overborne or unduly influenced, one must 
at least have had the legal capacity to make the decision in the first place). 
First, the most common legislative device applied to ensure the accuracy of 
the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis is requiring an independent physician to 
review the patient’s medical records, consult directly with the patient, and 
provide a second opinion. Variations of this requirement exist within all 
Australian Bills conforming to the permissive model.128  
Second, information requirements, specialist consultations and cooling-off 
periods all ensure the quality of the patient’s decision. All Australian Bills make 
information requirements a condition of accessing VE or PAS and the medical 
practitioner’s personal immunity from prosecution or civil suit.129 Information 
                                                 
123  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cls 5–6. 
124  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cl 12. 
125  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cl 17. These provisions, however, vary in scope and 
operation: cf ROTTIA s 18. 
126  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cls 15, 19–20. 
127  Other examples include Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 
(SA); Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 (Tas); Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2009 
(Vic); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA). 
128  See, eg, ROTTIA s 7(1)(c); Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) cl 7(1)(c); Voluntary Euthanasia 
Bill 2006 (SA) cl 5(2); Dying with Dignity Bill 2001 (Tas) cl 8(1)(c); Medical Treatment (Physician 
Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 5(m); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 (WA) cl 7(a). 
129  See, eg, ROTTIA s 7(1)(c); Right of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) cl 7(1)(g); Voluntary Euthanasia 
Bill 2007 (SA) cl 5(2); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 (WA) cl 7(b). 
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requirements enable patients to make a meaningful and autonomous decision  
by informing them of the nature of their condition, its likely progress,  
potential treatment options available, and the availability of supplementary 
support services.130 Specialist consultations generally require the intervention of 
psychiatric or palliative care specialists. The principal function of the psychiatric 
evaluation is to ensure the patient is not adversely affected by a psychological 
condition affecting their capacity to make the request to receive VE or PAS. 
Psychiatric specialists ascertain whether the patient exhibits a treatable 
depressive or other psychiatric illness which may underpin the request for VE or 
PAS. 131  The psychiatric evaluation, therefore, operates as both an eligibility 
criterion and patient safeguard. The primary object of palliative care specialists is 
to ensure the patient is aware of palliative options to mitigate the physical, 
psychological and existential pain associated with their terminal illness.132 The 
provision of cooling-off periods ensure the patient has the opportunity to 
understand information supplied by the medical practitioner and reconsider their 
decision. For example, the ROTTIA specified that the certificate of request could 
not be completed earlier than seven days from the initial request by the patient 
for their life to be terminated.133 
Finally, in addition to issues that go to the capacity and quality of the 
decision, medical practitioners are also required to be satisfied on ‘reasonable 
grounds’ that the patient’s decision is voluntary and unaffected by duress or 
undue influence.134 This is a separate issue from capacity, though it obviously 
overlaps with the issues discussed above concerning the quality of the actual 
decision made. We treat voluntariness separately, however, because it is 
normally a separately expressed requirement of its own in each of the models – 
whether the patient’s will has been overborne is in principle a different question 
from that of whether they have taken enough time to think about the decision or 
have made an adequately informed decision. Voluntariness is really about 
whether a decision in the true sense of the term has been taken by the patient at 
all. The requirement of ‘reasonable grounds’ imposes a positive duty on the 
practitioner to possess objective evidence that the request was voluntary. 
Supplementing the requirements of expert evaluation, most statutes regulating 
PAS and VE require a written request, generally within a prescribed form.135 
Writing requirements evidence both the request and that it originated from the 
patient rather than a third party. 
 
                                                 
130  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 (WA) cl 7(b). 
131  See, eg, Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) cl 7(e). 
132  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2007 (SA) cl 5(3). 
133  ROTTIA s 7(1)(i). 
134  See, eg, ROTTIA s 7(1)(h). 
135  See, eg, ROTTIA ss 7(1)(i)–(j); Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) cl 17; Voluntary Euthanasia 
Bill 2006 (SA) cl 7; Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 (Tas) cls 8(1)(j)–(k); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 
(WA) cls 10–11. 
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(b) Defence Models 
As stated above, under a defence model, in strict terms, when the defence is 
made out, this means that the defendant has still committed an offence, but it is 
an offence for which he or she should not be held criminally responsible. Given 
this, why adopt such a model? A possible advantage of the defence model is that, 
by keeping VE or PAS prima facie an offence, the value of human life is 
considered to be protected, at least symbolically. The model represents the 
position that, while VE and PAS should not be actively permitted, medical 
practitioners subject to extraordinary demands, who elect to safely assist patients 
in terminating their life, should not be penalised. The disadvantage is that anyone 
who complies with the Act and so has a defence, has still committed an offence 
(it means that a doctor has effectively committed a murder or manslaughter) – it 
is just that the law considers it an offence for which the defendant should not  
be criminally responsible. This disadvantage might explain why this model has  
only been introduced sparingly within Australia – doctors or other medical 
practitioners probably do not want to consider themselves as committing offences 
for which the law will not hold them responsible and so this would make the 
defence model unpopular. When the defence model was introduced the one time 
in South Australia, it was seen as a legislative compromise designed to generate 
consensus regarding the legalisation of VE and PAS – that is, the advantage was 
privileged over the disadvantage. It was introduced as a way of attempting to 
respond to the failure of 16 permissive model Bills in that state.136 Clause 3 of the 
Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) 
Amendment Bill 2011 (SA) would have inserted a defence to a charge of a 
relevant offence under the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). It would 
have been a defence to such a charge if the defendant could prove, on the balance 
of probabilities, that he or she acted in good faith in the ordinary course of the 
defendant’s employment, and that his or her conduct was a reasonable response 
to the patient’s suffering.137 
There were other differences between the defence model in the South 
Australian Bill and the more standard permissive model. In contrast to the 
permissive models, the Bill merely required the request for VE or PAS to be 
‘express’, as opposed to being reduced to writing or communicated within a 
prescribed form.138 Furthermore, there was no requirement for expert consultation 
by psychiatric or palliative care specialists. The principal protective requirements 
were that the treating practitioner must be a qualified medical practitioner and the 
administration of VE or PAS must be a ‘reasonable response’ to the patient’s 
                                                 
136  See generally South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 March 2011, 2849 
(Stephanie Key); South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 28 July 2011, 4726 
(Stephanie Key), where it was emphasised that the defensive model was a compromise designed to attain 
consensus on VE and PAS. 
137  See Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13B(3). 
138  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13B(1)(c). 
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request.139  Furthermore, unlike the permissive model, oversight and reporting 
mechanisms were notably absent. The details of whether the practitioner acted in 
good faith and whether the response in the circumstances was reasonable were to 
be left to the courts, which meant that parliament could avoid the danger of 
providing too many procedural requirements to be fulfilled before a practitioner 
could act on a patient’s request. This was a way of resolving the tension between 
the need to provide sufficient safeguards on the one hand, and the need to 
provide workable, practically orientated legislation, on the other.  
The defence model adopted in the South Australian Bill contained the 
following elements: 
 substantive defence: a person satisfying the relevant criteria incurs no 
civil, criminal or disciplinary liability;140 
 exculpating criteria: these include requiring the relevant person to prove 
he or she was a treating practitioner;141 that the person believed the adult 
to be of sound mind who was suffering from a medical condition which 
irreversibly rendered the patient’s quality of life intolerable;142 that the 
patient expressly requested the VE; 143  and that the conduct was a 
reasonable response to the patient’s suffering;144 
 accessorial liability: a defence was proposed, in certain circumstances, 
for any person who supported or assisted a medical practitioner in 
relation to the death of a person;145  
  
                                                 
139  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13B(1). 
140  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13B(6)(a). 
141  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 13B(1)(a), 
(2)(a). 
142  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 13B(1)(b), 
(2)(b). 
143  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 13B(1)(c), 
(2)(c). 
144  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 13B(1)(d), 
(2)(d). Note that the proposed s 13B(5) expressly states that the court must have regard to parliament’s 
intention that it is reasonable to terminate a person’s life in exceptional circumstances where the medical 
condition causes their life to become irreversibly intolerable, including where palliative care cannot 
relieve the suffering to a level acceptable to the person. 
145  To be protected, the medical practitioner must have been duly acquitted under the defence provisions (the 
proposed s 13B(3)(a)), and the conduct of the person supporting or assisting was in good faith in the 
ordinary course of their employment and was a reasonable response to the person’s suffering (the 
proposed s 13B(3)(b)). 
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 inchoate liability: the defences apply to circumstances where death was 
intended or suicide attempted, so it was not necessary to prove the patient 
in fact died;146 and 
 negativing fault elements: the defence could only be invoked if the 
conduct occurred in good faith without negligence.147 
 
(c) Penalty Mitigation Models 
The penalty mitigation model was only introduced after the enactment of the 
Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth) which withdrew the legislative competence of 
the Australian territories to enact legislation permitting VE or PAS. There have 
been two such Bills. The relevant loophole the Bills attempted to exploit was that 
the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth) deprived the territories of their power to 
enact legislation which permits, or has the effect of permitting, VE or PAS. The 
Bills, by imposing minor fines for committing VE according to prescribed 
procedural safeguards, arguably did not permit VE or PAS insofar as the practice 
remained prohibited, because it was still associated with criminal penalties. 
Clauses 3, 5 and 6 of the Crimes (Assisted Suicide) Bill 1997 (ACT) are 
examples.148 The safeguards contained within the penalty mitigation model tend 
to be significantly less comprehensive than those in the permissive model. The 
above Australian Capital Territory Bill, for example, prescribed that requests for 
assistance must be in writing; 149  a cooling-off period of 72 hours; 150  and an 
independent medical practitioner must confirm that the patient was in a terminal 
phase of a terminal illness and suffering severe pain or distress.151 While the 
imposition of writing requirements, cooling-off periods and limited independent 
consultation augments patient protection, the penalty mitigation model tends to 
lack the comprehensive protective frameworks contained within the permissive 
model. 
 
                                                 
146  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 13B(1)–(3). 
147  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13B(6)(a). 
148  The Bill was defeated resoundingly 3:14 (supported only by Michael Moore and the two Australian 
Greens members): Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 
November 1997, 3673. The Bill lost the support of two VE supporters, Wayne Berry and Simon Corbell, 
who regarded the Bill as ‘trivialising’ euthanasia: at 3656 (Wayne Berry); reinforcing opposing 
arguments by causing the pecuniary penalty to be less than a speeding ticket: at 3665 (Simon Corbell); 
and the associated concern of adverse media and public reactions: at 3656 (Wayne Berry). Another 
example of the penalty mitigation model is the Criminal Code (Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 1997 (NT) 
which imposed a $50 fine on medical practitioners performing VE subject to prescribed legislative 
criteria similar to that discussed under the Crimes (Assisted Suicide) Bill 1997 (ACT). See further 
Northern Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 February 1998, 639–45 (John 
Bailey). 
149  Crimes (Assisted Suicide) Bill 1997 (ACT) cls 3 (definition of ‘request’), 5(a). 
150  Crimes (Assisted Suicide) Bill 1997 (ACT) cl 5(c). 
151  Crimes (Assisted Suicide) Bill 1997 (ACT) cl 5(b). 
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3 Exclusive and Inclusive Illness Models 
It is also possible to categorise the models in terms of the nature of the illness 
that must be suffered by the person seeking assistance to die. Some Bills (which 
we call ‘exclusive’ models) only operated if the patient suffered from a terminal 
illness, or even the ‘terminal phase’ of a terminal illness.152 There were 20 of 
these exclusive models. Other models (‘inclusive’ models) adopt a broader 
conception of the illnesses, including, for example, incurable and other chronic 
illnesses.153 There were nine of these inclusive models. In one South Australian 
Bill, a defendant would have been entitled to a defence against criminal liability 
if the defendant could prove, among other things, that the person whose death 
resulted ‘from the administration of drugs … by the defendant’ was suffering 
from a ‘qualifying illness’.154 Under that Bill, a ‘qualifying illness’ meant ‘an 
illness, injury or other medical condition that irreversibly impaired the person’s 
quality of life so that life had become intolerable to that person’.155 This provision 
would have allowed somebody who suffered an accident making them a 
quadriplegic to end their lives if they found life as a quadriplegic intolerable. 
 
4 Nature of ‘Pain’ and ‘Suffering’ 
Pain and/or suffering156 tends to be an essential eligibility criterion within 
most proposed Australian regulatory frameworks. Although some similarities 
exist between Bills, significantly different notions of the ‘pain’ and/or ‘suffering’ 
that must be endured before a person can be assisted to die are adopted. 
Distinctions lie in different conceptual requirements such as ‘existential 
suffering’, how pain and/or suffering is ascertained, and the causal connection 
between the illness and the relevant pain and/or suffering.157 
 
                                                 
152  Medical Treatment (Amendment) Bill 1995 (ACT); Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2011 (NSW). An 
extreme example of this model is the Death with Dignity Acts of three states in the United States (Or Rev 
Stat §§ 127.800–127.995 (1994); Wash Rev Code §§ 70.245.010–70.245.904 (2008); Vt Stat Ann §§ 
5281–93 (2013)) which restrict PAS to only imminently lethal medical conditions by requiring the person 
to be in the terminal phase of a terminal illness and within six months of death. 
153  Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic); Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 
(NSW); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 2008 
(SA). 
154  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13B(1)(b). 
155  Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 
(SA) cl 3, inserting what would have been Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13B(1)(b). 
156  We discuss when it is just pain, when it is pain and suffering, and when it is pain or suffering below. We 
also discuss the distinction between pain and suffering below. In the text, when we refer to ‘“pain” and 
“suffering”’, we are referring to these terms as they are used separately. By contrast, when we refer to 
‘pain and suffering’, we are referring to that phrase as used in a statute, and as therefore embodying the 
requirement that there be both pain and suffering. The same considerations apply to the use of ‘“pain” or 
“suffering”’ and ‘pain or suffering’, though we shall also use ‘pain and/or suffering’ to signify these 
alternatives. 
157  Some important academic work by medical practitioners has been undertaken on the concept of suffering 
that it is outside the scope of the present article: see Eric J Cassel, ‘The Nature of Suffering and the Goals 
of Medicine’ (1982) 306 New England Journal of Medicine 639. 
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(a) Defining ‘Pain’ and ‘Suffering’ 
There is an important distinction between pain and suffering. A person can 
‘suffer’ if they experience pain, but need not experience pain in order to ‘suffer’. 
‘Suffering’ is broader than pain and can include mental suffering and emotional 
suffering. In the case of the Bills introduced in Australia so far, the ‘nature’ of 
the pain and/or suffering required turns upon the label used to describe the 
‘suffering’ and whether the terms appear together, either conjunctively or 
disjunctively, and on whether only one term is used or more than one is used. 
Many Bills and statutes refer to ‘pain’, ‘distress’ and ‘suffering’;158 others to 
‘pain’ and ‘distress’;159 while others refer simply to ‘pain’.160 The word ‘and’ 
means that the patient needs to be considered to be experiencing all or both, as 
the case may be. Likewise, if only one of the terms is used, especially the 
narrower term ‘pain’, this might (subject to a point we make in the next 
paragraph) limit the circumstances in which a request can be made. By contrast, 
where the word ‘or’ is used along with ‘pain’, ‘suffering’, and ‘distress’, the 
provisions are more expansive.  
On the other hand, considering the substantial overlap between the concepts 
of ‘pain’, ‘distress’ and ‘suffering’, it is unclear to what extent the use of the 
single term ‘pain’ is distinguishable from the more expansive ones. For example, 
it is possible that ‘pain’ could be interpreted to encompass physical, mental and 
emotional suffering. Alternatively, a narrower understanding of the term might 
restrict it to physical pain. Whether the expanded or narrow definition is adopted 
would then depend on the relevant statutory framework.161 If both ‘pain’ and 
‘suffering’ are used in the same statute, then it is likely that ‘pain’ would be 
given the narrower reading – for it is a rule of statutory construction that all terms 
used in the statute be given a meaning, so the word ‘pain’ would arguably not be 
interpreted in such a wide way if the words ‘suffering’ (and ‘distress’) are also 
used. But of course any such restriction would be overcome by the use of the 
other terms that give it its restricted meaning in the first place.  
A Victorian Bill provided that ‘intolerable suffering’ means ‘profound 
suffering and/or distress, whether physical, psychological or existential,  
                                                 
158  See, eg, Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) cl 4; ROTTIA s 4. 
159  See, eg, Medical Treatment (Amendment) Bill 1997 (ACT) cl 10, inserting what would have been 
Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) ss 6A(d), 6B(2)(a)(ii). 
160  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2006 (SA) cl 4(2)(b). 
161  As remedial or beneficial legislation, the courts may be more likely to adopt an expansive interpretation 
consistent with the objects of the legislation, namely providing a systematic framework enabling patients 
to terminate their suffering. See, eg, Wacal Developments Pty Ltd v Realty Developments Pty Ltd (1978) 
140 CLR 503, 519–20 (Mason J); Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v NSW Aboriginal Land 
Council (2008) 237 CLR 285, 290–3 [9]–[20] (Kirby J); Butler v Fife Coal Co Ltd [1912] AC 149, 178–9 
(Lord Shaw). On this basis, it is arguable that a more expansive interpretation of pain would be more 
appropriate. 
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that is intolerable to the patient’. 162  Contrasting existential with physical and 
psychological suffering might suggest a different meaning of the term, 
incorporating, for example, a lack of ‘meaning’ within a person’s life, inability to 
self-actualise or severe despair. That said, even if this broader definition is 
adopted, ‘existential suffering’ possesses significant overlap with the concept of 
psychological suffering and, in practice, the two concepts may frequently be 
indistinguishable. The broadest concept of ‘suffering’ is contained within the 
Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 
2008 (SA). It is defined to include the irreversible impairment of a person’s 
quality of life.163 ‘Quality of life’ encompasses all relevant factors which may 
affect a person’s capacity for pleasure or displeasure. 
 
(b) Degree and Durability of Pain and Suffering 
The regulatory frameworks examined adopted diverse formulations of ‘pain’ 
and ‘suffering’, which are generally defined according to degree and durability. 
The degree of ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’ the patient must be experiencing varied 
between Bills and was defined using inexact phrases such as ‘severe’, 
‘considerable’, ‘unbearable’ and ‘intolerable’. For example, the Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) requires that a medical practitioner be satisfied 
the patient is experiencing ‘severe pain or suffering’ without defining the concept 
of ‘severe’. 164  The Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) refers to a patient 
experiencing pain, suffering or debilitation which is ‘considerable’.165 Other Bills 
refer to pain the person finds ‘unbearable’,166 and so is defined by reference to the 
individual’s subjective experience. 167  ‘Intolerable suffering’ is another phrase 
used which, again, is defined subjectively as profound suffering or distress which 
is intolerable to the patient.168  
The distinction between ‘considerable’, ‘unbearable’, ‘severe’ and 
‘intolerable’ pain and/or suffering is a question of degree. A patient experiencing 
‘considerable’ pain may not be in ‘severe’ pain and may not be experiencing 
‘unbearable’ or ‘intolerable’ pain. ‘Intolerable’ or ‘unbearable’, by contrast,  
seem to be synonymous. The difference in degree only becomes relevant  
                                                 
162  Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 3 (definition of ‘intolerable suffering’). 
The concept of ‘intolerable’ or ‘unbearable’ suffering is discussed in detail by H R W Pasman et al, 
‘Concept of Unbearable Suffering in Context of Ungranted Requests for Euthanasia: Qualitative 
Interviews with Patients and Physicians’ (2009) 339 British Medical Journal 1235. The authors discuss 
the conflict between patients and doctors in understanding what ‘unbearable’ and ‘intolerable’ require. 
163  Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 2008 (SA) cl 
19(1)(b)(ii). 
164  Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2011 (NSW) cl 7(f). However, other Bills, eg, Medical Treatment 
(Amendment) Bill 1995 (ACT), which require severe pain or distress, introduce subjective elements by 
specifying that it cannot be controlled by medical treatment to the person’s satisfaction. 
165  Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) cl 6(1)(f)(i). 
166  Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cl 4(2)(b). 
167  Ibid. 
168  Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 3 (definition of ‘intolerable suffering’); 
Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 (Tas) cl 3 (definition of ‘intolerable suffering’). See also Medical 
Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 2008 (SA) cl 19(1)(b)(ii). 
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as a procedural criterion where there is an objective arbiter. The Rights of  
the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) implicitly suggests that the question  
as to whether the patient is suffering ‘severe’ pain will be a matter of  
medical judgment. 169 However, contemporary medical practice recognises that 
the capacity of a person to withstand pain varies between individuals.170 More 
commonly, however, Bills such as the Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 (Tas) and 
Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) require the patient 
to make the assessment, stating that the pain must be unacceptable to the 
patient.171 When the patient is the arbiter of the pain, the semantic distinction 
between differing degrees of suffering dissolves. Some Bills, such as the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA), are silent in relation to the arbiter of the 
degree of pain the patient suffers.172  
The ‘durability’ of pain or suffering, or both pain and suffering, must be 
distinguished from the irreversibility or incurability of the illness. An illness  
may be irreversible or incurable, but painless, though presumably one can  
‘suffer from’ an irreversible or incurable illness. Here, though, ‘suffer’ just means 
to have or experience the illness and must be distinguished from the kind  
of suffering that accompanies the illness or medical condition, which the use of 
the word ‘suffering’ is intended to refer to. Durability may be defined as 
continuous or long-lasting pain or suffering. The requirement of ‘durability’ or 
repeated requests is also contemplated within statutes with cooling-off periods.173 
Incorporated within the concept of durability is pain mitigation. This question is 
distinct from curability because it relates to pain palliation or, if the symptoms do 
not cause pain, suffering palliation. The ROTTIA, for example, imposes a 
                                                 
169  This is pursuant to its positioning in cl 7(1) of the Bill, which requires the medical practitioner to satisfy 
several elements prior to administering VE. 
170  Margo McCaffery, ‘Understanding Your Patient’s Pain Tolerance’ (1999) 29(12) Nursing 17, 17; G F 
Gebhart, ‘Pain’ in Marc D Binder, Nobutaka Hirokawa and Uwe Windhorst (eds), Encyclopedia of 
Neuroscience (Springer, 2009) 3063. 
171  Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 (Tas) cl 3 (definition of ‘intolerable suffering’); Medical Treatment 
(Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 3 (definition of ‘intolerable suffering’). There may be an 
ambiguity in the case of the latter Bill. The Bill required the treating doctor to be ‘satisfied on reasonable 
grounds that the sufferer has a terminal or incurable illness that is causing the sufferer intolerable 
suffering’: at cl 5(c). On the wording of the Bill, it could mean that the doctor must be reasonably 
satisfied that the patient has a terminal and incurable illness only, and not also reasonably satisfied that 
the terminal or incurable illness is causing the patient intolerable suffering (that being an issue that is only 
determinable by the patient himself or herself). Or it could mean that the doctor must be reasonably 
satisfied of both. On the first reading, ‘intolerable suffering’ is still given a subjective interpretation – 
what counts as ‘intolerable’ is determined exclusively by the patient. On the second interpretation, by 
contrast, ‘intolerable suffering’ must be given an objective meaning. Would a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position consider the suffering to be intolerable? The wording of the other clauses in the Bill 
suggest that only the former reading is intended – what counts as intolerable is to be judged by the 
patient. 
172  Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) cl 6(1)(f)(i). 
173  See, eg, ROTTIA s 7(1)(i); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cl 11(1)(f); Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 
(Tas) cl 8(1)(n). 
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requirement that palliative care must be unable to alleviate pain and/or suffering 
to levels acceptable to the patient.174 
 
(c) Causality 
The various Bills also differ in terms of the required nexus between suffering 
and/or pain on the one hand, and illness on the other. Some Bills expressly 
require an objective causal relationship between the illness and the suffering.175 
For example, under the Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 
(Vic), the treating doctor must be reasonably satisfied that the sufferer has a 
terminal or incurable illness that is causing the patient intolerable suffering.176 
Other Bills merely require the existence of a ‘relationship’ between illness and 
the pain and/or suffering. For example, the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) 
requires the patient to experience pain, suffering or debilitation that is ‘related to 
the relevant terminal illness’.177 
The concept of ‘causation’ would clearly encompass pain and/or suffering 
directly deriving from the illness as a causative factor, but, on a broad 
interpretation, may also incorporate the existential pain a professional athlete 
may experience on discovering that, by reason of some debilitating illness or 
disability, they may never compete again. In contrast, and depending on the 
conception of causality adopted, it would not encompass a request for VE 
pursuant to significant existential pain deriving from, say, a partner divorcing the 
patient after he or she contracts the terminal illness.  
However, this existential pain may fall within the ambit of the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) because there is a relationship between the divorce 
and the terminal illness, even where the terminal illness was merely connected, 
and not necessarily a determinative or significantly contributing factor, to the 
divorce. There may be other examples, such as where a pre-existing 
psychological illness is exacerbated, but not necessarily caused, by a terminal 
illness, and the psychiatric disorder is the primary motivation underpinning the 
request for VE. In jurisdictions adopting a causal criterion, the court is likely to 
adopt either the ‘but for’ or ‘material contribution’ tests for causation.178 Where 
the ‘but for’ test is adopted, the distinction between requiring a causal 
relationship rather than a mere relationship becomes more evident. However, if 
the court adopts the material contribution test, the judiciary may determine that a 
causal relationship exists notwithstanding that existential, psychological or 
physical pain derives from a combination of the terminal illness and other related 
                                                 
174  ROTTIA s 8(1). 
175  The Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1998 (WA) cl 4(2)(b) implies the existence of a relationship of proximity, 
similar to a causal relationship, through requiring the existence of pain, suffering or debilitation 
associated with the ‘actual progress of [the] illness or condition’. 
176  Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 5(c). 
177  Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) cl 6(1)(f)(ii). 
178  The ‘but for’ test means that the illness would be the sole cause of the pain and/or suffering. The 
‘material contribution test’ means that the illness would be one, but not the only, cause of the pain and/or 
suffering – there may be other causes as well, and it suffices that the illness only be one of them. 
2016 (Failed) Voluntary Euthanasia Law Reform in Australia 39 
sources. Regardless of which test is selected, in the majority of cases, it is 
unlikely that the distinction between the requirement for causality and a mere 
relationship will be determinative. 
 
5 Current and Advance Request Models 
The majority of VE Bills adopt a current request model (21 in total), which 
allows a person to make a request for assistance to die only while he or she has 
capacity.179 By contrast, an advance request model (of which there have been 
eight), where a request continues to operate if the person subsequently loses legal 
capacity, has been adopted by the South Australian Dignity in Dying Bills 
introduced in 2001–05, which provide for an advance request to be made by a 
person who is not yet ‘hopelessly ill’.180 Finally, some VE Bills have permitted 
surrogate decision-making.181  
 
6  Oversight Mechanisms 
Most legislative models provide for oversight of VE and PAS practice. There 
are two common oversight mechanisms: (a) establishing a monitoring and 
reporting entity; or (b) utilising an existing entity for monitoring and reporting 
purposes. In Australia, the vast majority of Bills permitting VE or PAS opt for 
the second approach and require medical reporting to the coroner, who is 
responsible for monitoring, evaluating and reporting on the operation of the 
system.182 
 
7  Common Features in Models  
The models introduced in Australia exhibit many similarities. The 
overwhelming majority of proposed frameworks adopt the permissive model –  
                                                 
179  See, eg, Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) cl 4; ROTTIA s 4. See also, eg, Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) cl 5; Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 (Tas) cl 5. 
180  Dignity in Dying Bill 2001 (SA) cl 6, introduced by Sandra Kanck; Dignity in Dying Bill 2001 (SA) cl 6, 
introduced by Bob Such; Dignity in Dying Bill 2002 (SA) cl 6; Dignity in Dying Bill 2003 (SA) cl 
6(1)(b); Dignity in Dying Bill 2005 (SA) cl 6(1)(b). The primary safeguard in relation to the advance 
request is that the patient be informed of feasible VE procedures and the risks associated with them (see, 
eg, Dignity in Dying Bill 2005 (SA) cl 7(1)(c)), as well as in conjunction with witnessing and 
certification procedures (see, eg, Dignity in Dying Bill 2005 (SA) cls 8–9). 
181  See, eg, Medical Treatment (Amendment) Bill 1995 (ACT) cl 19, which would have amended Medical 
Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 13, provided that where an adult is of sound mind, and suffering severe pain 
in the terminal phase of a terminal illness, they may execute an instrument conferring on another person 
the power to request the administration of VE in the event that the patient becomes incapacitated. 
182  See, eg, Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 (Tas) cl 16(1); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 (WA) cl 11(1); 
Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 16; ROTTIA ss 14–15. Cf Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 2006 (SA) cl 19, which establishes the Voluntary Euthanasia Monitoring Committee. 
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35 of the 39 Bills, including all of those that were ‘close to passing’.183 In all 
Australian Bills (and the repealed Northern Territory Act), assistance to die 
would be available only to an adult who is enduring pain or suffering and/or has 
a terminal illness. The person is to be competent at the time of the request, and 
the request must be made voluntarily – that is, even when made by a person who 
has capacity, it is not made under duress or undue influence. Under some models, 
assistance to die can be given to a person who no longer has capacity provided 
the request was made when he or she did have capacity.184 Rarely, the legislative 
proposal allows the request to be made under a power of attorney.185 Generally, 
the individual was permitted to determine whether his or her suffering satisfied 
the required pain threshold to receive VE or PAS. 186  Most Australian Bills 
adopted a broad interpretation of the categories of pain and suffering, frequently 
including physical, psychological and existential pain.187 
Most Australian Bills contain consultative requirements which may 
necessitate obtaining information from independent medical, psychiatric or 
palliative care specialists.188 These consultative requirements facilitate specialist 
assessment about whether the individual is suffering a treatable psychiatric 
condition, which could vitiate a request for VE or PAS,189 or acting under duress 
or undue influence. 190  Most Bills require written requests using a prescribed 
form,191  and incorporate cooling-off periods.192  A number of Bills incorporate 
                                                 
183  One Bill (2.6 per cent) can be categorised as the defence model (Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical 
Defences – End of Life Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2011 (SA)), and two Bills (5.1 per cent) have 
adopted the penalty mitigation model (Crimes (Assisted Suicide) Bill 1997 (ACT); Criminal Code 
(Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 1997 (NT)).The penalty mitigation models have only been introduced 
within the Australian territories immediately after the enactment of the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth) 
to circumscribe its removal of legislative competency in respect of legalising or decriminalising VE or 
PAS. 
184  See, eg, Dignity in Dying Bill 2001 (SA) cl 6, introduced by Sandra Kanck; Dignity in Dying Bill 2001 
(SA) cl 6, introduced by Bob Such; Dignity in Dying Bill 2002 (SA) cl 6; Dignity in Dying Bill 2003 
(SA) cl 6(1)(b); Dignity in Dying Bill 2005 (SA) cl 6(1)(b). 
185  See, eg, Medical Treatment (Amendment) Bill 1995 (ACT) cl 19, which would have amended Medical 
Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 13. 
186  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2012 (SA) s 4(2)(b); Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) 
Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 3 (definition of ‘intolerable suffering’); Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 (Tas) cl 3 
(definition of ‘intolerable suffering’). 
187  For broad definitions of the concept of suffering see, eg, Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) 
Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 3; Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 
2008 (SA) cl 19(1); Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) cl 4; ROTTIA s 4. However, as noted 
above, where pain is used on its own, it may well be given an equally broad interpretation. When used 
alongside ‘suffering’, it may be restricted to physical pain, but the addition of the word suffering will 
mean that the definition is broad unless the terms appear conjunctively, which would limit the 
circumstances of suffering to suffering associated with physical pain.  
188  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2007 (SA) cl 5(3); Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2001 (NSW) cl 
7(1)(e). 
189  See, eg, ROTTIA s 7(1)(c)(iv). 
190  See, eg, ROTTIA s 7(1)(h). 
191  See, eg, Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2006 (SA) cl 7; ROTTIA ss 7(1)(i)–(j); Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 
(Tas) cls 8(1)(i)–(j). 
192  See, eg, ROTTIA s 7(1)(i); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 (WA) cl 8(3); Medical Treatment (Physician 
Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 5(o). 
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residency requirements restricting the availability of VE,193 although this was not 
a feature of the Northern Territory legislation. As an oversight measure, the vast 
majority of Bills permitting VE or PAS require medical reporting to the coroner, 
who is responsible for monitoring, evaluating and reporting on the system.194 
In Part III above, we stated that seven of the Bills introduced into Australia 
were ‘close to passing’ (as we have defined that term). Are there any features of 
these Bills, when compared to those that did not meet this threshold, which might 
explain why they were able to get so far? For instance, did the provisions 
concerning safeguards in these Bills have anything in common that would 
suggest that members of parliament were close to believing that the provisions 
addressed well-known concerns about these safeguards? Or did the Bills only 
make lawful VE or PAS in circumstances where a person is terminally ill, 
thereby limiting the range of circumstances in which a person can avail 
themselves of the new laws and so making the Bill more palatable for the 
members of parliament who had to vote on it? Again, were the Bills that were 
close to passing restricted to PAS, VE, or did they include both? There are 
certainly common features in these Bills, but none of these features sets them 
apart from the features of many of the other Bills we have mentioned that were 
not close to passing. And there were also differences among the Bills on the 
issues that normally remain controversial, such as whether the Bills were 
restricted to terminal illnesses only, and whether they regulated only PAS or only 
VE, or included both. Two of the South Australia Bills that were close to passing, 
for instance, were not limited to terminal illness.195 This seems to speak against 
the idea that a Bill has a greater chance of passing if it is restricted to cases where 
a patient is terminally ill.196  Finally, all the Bills that came close to passing 
contemplated both PAS and VE. There was no restriction exclusively to one or 
the other, as one might have expected if a more restricted proposal were put 
forward. There is no sound basis for concluding that the nature of these Bills 
made them go further than the nature of the Bills that did not come close to 
passing. 
 
                                                 
193  See, eg, Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 5(b); Dying with Dignity Bill 
2009 (Tas) cl 9.  
194  See, eg, Dying with Dignity Bill 2009 (Tas) cl 16(1); Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2000 (WA) cl 11(1); 
Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (Vic) cl 16; ROTTIA ss 14–15. Cf Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 2006 (SA) s 19, which establishes the Voluntary Euthanasia Monitoring Committee. 
195  Dignity in Dying Bill 2001 (SA); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary 
Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 2008 (SA). 
196  By contrast, could it be argued that, within SA, a Bill that is broader has a greater chance of passing than 
a Bill that is narrower? No, for there are SA Bills with the same requirements that were not close to 
passing, such as the Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences – End of Life Arrangements) 
Amendment Bill 2011 (SA). 
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V   CONCLUSION 
This article has examined two decades of attempted VE reform in Australia. 
The trends over this period were explored, along with the extent to which Bills 
progressed (or did not progress) through the relevant houses of parliament. The 
analysis of reform attempts was also considered in a political context and some 
tentative conclusions were drawn about why some Bills gained more political 
support than others. The second half of the article focused on analysing the 
various models that have been advanced to change the law, including examining 
them through different lenses (substantive, structural and procedural). This 
analysis concluded by determining typical approaches to proposed reform in 
Australia, namely a permissive model that covers both VE and PAS and is 
limited to competent adults who are terminally or incurably ill and experiencing 
suffering (variously defined). Multiple safeguards are proposed and there are 
official oversight mechanisms, generally involving reporting to the coroner. 
The authors predict that VE law reform is likely to occur in Australia. There 
is a convergence of factors that make this issue increasingly difficult for 
politicians to ignore: high and sustained public support for reform in Australia; 
an ageing and increasingly informed population seeking choices for their end-of-
life experience; the changing legal landscape internationally; and the media’s 
interest in the topic and, particularly for social media, its agitation for change. 
These factors are evidenced by an increasing trend of parliamentary activity in 
this area such as through the introduction of Bills, the release of exposure drafts 
of Bills and the establishment of select committees. And once the first state or 
territory enacts legislation, others are likely to follow.  
As to when that occurs, no doubt the prevailing political context will be 
critical. And, in that regard, we make two concluding observations. The first is 
that who the proponent for reform is may be decisive in whether or not it 
succeeds. Marshall Perron was the proponent of the only VE Bill ever to have 
succeeded in Australia, and he was (for much of the relevant time at least) the 
Chief Minister in the Northern Territory as well as being seen as a popular and 
charismatic character. Two of the other Bills that we classified as ‘close to 
passing’ were supported by high-profile politicians including Larissa Giddings 
and Nicholas McKim (the 2013 Bill in Tasmania) and Jay Weatherill, Pat Conlon 
and Paul Caica (the 2012 Bill in South Australia). This observation, if correct, 
has implications for the immediate future now that Richard Di Natale, who has 
released an exposure draft of a Bill advocating for reform, is leader of the 
Australian Greens. The second point is that we can be confident that politicians 
will engage with the issue of VE reform more directly if the public places it on 
the political agenda, as opposed to merely supporting the concept of reform when 
their views are sought in opinion polls. Given the increasing extent to which 
euthanasia reform is becoming part of the political discourse in the lead up to 
elections, it may be that we are approaching the point where major political 
parties may be forced to develop policy positions on reform. 
Given reform efforts to date, the model described above is likely to be the 
one enacted in Australia. But despite a broadly consistent approach taken 
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nationally, there are still important legislative choices to be made. For example, 
the word ‘suffering’ can encompass different aspects of a person’s experience 
and can also be judged from different perspectives. The analysis undertaken in 
this article can be of assistance for legislators and policymakers in identifying 
and unpacking choices such as these. While the international experience is 
outside the scope of this article, some of the features of the Australian models are 
consistent with international models. This points to the need to learn from the 
experiences of those jurisdictions. There is now an increasing body of empirical 
evidence as to the operation of these VE and/or PAS regimes and this needs to be 
considered when deciding whether to undertake reform or not, and the actual 
design of proposed reforms.197 
The enactment of legislation that provides state imprimatur for a health 
professional (or another) to end a person’s life (or provide assistance for a person 
to take their own life) is a significant step, and should be recognised as such. 
Concerns about the effect of such a shift on the community and particularly the 
vulnerable within our community have been an important part of the debate for 
many decades. It is not the purpose of this article to engage with the merit or 
otherwise of these arguments but one of the key considerations when proposing 
law reform is to consider carefully how and if a model for VE and/or PAS 
addresses these issues. To assist with those deliberations, we offer the analysis in 
this article of the various Bills that have been introduced into Australian 
parliaments to date. The authors hope that this analysis will inform community 
debate, too frequently littered with inaccurate claims about what is or has been 
proposed when VE or PAS Bills are drafted. We also hope that this article will 
assist in cultivating a more sophisticated understanding of the various regulatory 
models, and the options that are available to parliaments when considering 
legislative reform. 
 
  
                                                 
197  See, eg, Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Trends in End-of-Life Practices before and after the 
Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-sectional 
Survey’ (2012) 380 The Lancet 908; Kenneth Chambaere et al, ‘Trends in Medical End-of-Life Decision 
Making in Flanders, Belgium: 1998–2001–2007’ (2011) Medical Decision Making 500; Kenneth 
Chambaere et al, ‘Physician-Assisted Deaths under the Euthanasia Law in Belgium: A Population-Based 
Survey’ (2010) 182 Canadian Medical Association Journal 895; Luc Deliens et al, ‘End-of-Life 
Decisions in Medical Practice in Flanders, Belgium: A Nationwide Survey’ (2000) 356 The Lancet 1806; 
Paul van der Maas et al, ‘Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices Involving 
the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990–1995’ (1996) 335 New England Journal of Medicine 1699; Paul 
J van der Mass, ‘Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life’ (1991) 338 The 
Lancet 669. 
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APPENDIX: LEGISLATIVE REFORM ATTEMPTS IN 
AUSTRALIA198 
 
                                                 
198  This table expands a similar table included in White and Willmott, above n 24. 
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